Showing posts with label DOL. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DOL. Show all posts

4/29/13

"Mr. Hartzman does not identify any specific reporting practice by Wells Fargo with respect tho these "secret" loans

Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 10:37 AM

from: george.hartzman@wellsfargoadvisors.com to: aaron.l.landry@wellsfargoadvisors.com, danny.ludeman@wellsfargoadvisors.com, john.g.stumpf@wellsfargo.com, d.carroll@wellsfargo.com, stacey.mitchell@wellsfargoadvisors.com, don.geczi@wellsfargoadvisors.com, baconmij@wellsfargo.com, bill.rogers@wellsfargoadvisors.com, doug.lowe@wellsfargoadvisors.com, BoardCommunications@wellsfargo.com, karl.f.riem@wellsfargo.com, Grant.Carlson@wellsfargo.com, Bruce.J.Berrol@wellsfargo.com

Attachments; 10k.doc
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“LIQUIDITY AND FUNDING

Asset liquidity is further enhanced by our ability to sell or securitize loans in secondary markets and to pledge loans to access secured borrowing facilities through the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Reserve Board, or the U.S. Treasury.

[Ability doesn't mean borrowed]

Short-term borrowings averaged $65.8 billion in 2008 and $25.9 billion in 2007, an increase of $39.9 billion due to business funding needs.”

Wells Fargo 2008 10k

[no mention of FED TAF loans or Discount Window borrowing]
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Falsification of any company…information that you provide is prohibited.

Falsification refers to knowingly misstating, altering, adding information to, or omitting or deleting information …which results in something that is untrue, fraudulent, or misleading.

Wells Fargo’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct
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“Asset liquidity is further enhanced by our ability to sell or securitize loans in secondary markets and to pledge loans to access secured borrowing facilities through the Federal Home Loan Banks, the FRB, or the U.S. Treasury.

Short-term borrowings averaged $52.0 billion in 2009 and $65.8 billion in 2008.

We reduced short-term borrowings due to the continued liquidation of previously identified non-strategic and liquidating loan portfolios, soft loan demand and strong deposit growth.”

2009 10k

[no mention of FED TAF loans or Discount Window borrowing]
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Short-Term Borrowings

2007: 53,255.0

2008: 108,074.0

2009: 38,966.0

2010: 55,401.0

[no mention of FED TAF loans or Discount Window borrowing]
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Sarbanes–Oxley Act

...mandates that senior executives take individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of corporate financial reports.

...Section 302 requires that the company's "principal officers" (typically the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer) certify and approve the integrity of their company financial reports quarterly.

Title IV ...requires timely reporting of material changes in financial condition...

Sarbanes-Oxley required the disclosure of all material off-balance sheet items.

It ...specifies the responsibility of corporate officers for the accuracy and validity of corporate financial reports.

...The CEO and CFO are now required to unequivocally take ownership for their financial statements under Section 302…

Title IV ...requires timely reporting of material changes in financial condition...

Sarbanes-Oxley required the disclosure of all material off-balance sheet items.

Wikipedia

"SEC Charges City of Harrisburg for Fraudulent Public Statements" and Hartzman v Wells Fargo with a Mash Up

"Washington, D.C., May 6, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the City of Harrisburg, Pa., with securities fraud for its misleading public statements when its financial condition was deteriorating and financial information available to ...investors was incomplete...

Wells Fargo's "Envision is [not] an advisory tool..., but is instead an "information gathering" and discussion generating tool"

"Clients have no expectations that the Envision program provides a guaranteed outcome."

Gregory C. Keaton, attorney for Wells Fargo against George Hartzman
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Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, …to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; or... to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
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A Wells Fargo "Internal Use Only" document "Presenting Envision results that matter" (0211-5064) states "Although it may be unintended and clearly disclosed away, this report will serve as a guarantee (in the eyes of the client) of how reality should unfold. It illustrates what they should have in taxable assets in 2013, their tax bill in 2015 and their net portfolio withdrawal in 2020. No matter how many disclosures that are made, how else would you perceive this report if you were a client?" and "With the Envision process, the job is to focus on what matters: the client’s confidence and comfort in achieving the goals they value most. Presenting results that matter is what creates the confidence and comfort the client desires."

Wells Fargo Advisor's "Presenting Envision results that matter" states "If the client has any doubts about the underlying assumptions, Advisors should be prepared to provide clarity and rationale. Observe that this is based on “IF” the client has doubts about assumptions, which means advisors do not need to burden clients with a detailed explanation of the assumptions if they are not in doubt of your ability to understand their goals and priorities." and "If the client asks you how their confidence is measured, this will require a careful explanation but it should not be focused on mathematics. Instead, the focus should be on the results of the math." And "If you fall into the red, above target zone, you are making needless sacrifices to your lifestyle...," meaning some clients may be spending more than they "should", if investment fees are not included in Envision plan target zone calculations.

Section 36 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "The Commission is authorized to bring an action...alleging that a person ...is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts, or at the time of the alleged misconduct, so served or acted — as ...investment adviser...”

“...the investment adviser … shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company… to such investment adviser… An action may be brought … by the Commission...against such investment adviser... who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company...to such investment adviser or person. …It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty."

4/22/13

Wells Fargo's attorney re; Wells Fargo Advisors LLC / Hartzman / 4-3750-13-010

Perhaps an indication of the importance of a whistleblower filing can be found in the quality of the opponent;
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Gregory Keating
Shareholder
Chair, Whistleblowing and Retaliation Practice Group
The nation’s largest labor and employment law firm; Littler Mendelson
Author of the nationally recognized, authoritative treatise,
Retaliation & Whistleblowing: A Guide for HR Professionals & Counsel

10/8/12

Did Wells Fargo CEO John G. Stumpf profit from stock and option compensation while not disclosing material information?

If Wells Fargo & Company’s board of directors
approved a grant of retention performance shares
for President and CEO John G. Stumpf and three other executive officers,
and all of the above were aware of secret Federal Reserve Loans,
how did they not benefit from insider trading?