Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009)

"Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009),
is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a judge to recuse himself not only when actual bias has been demonstrated
or when the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case,
but also when "extreme facts" create a "probability of bias."

...Represented by former U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson,
Caperton filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court
arguing that Blankenship's 2004 campaign expenditures on behalf of Benjamin's election
raised an appearance of partiality on Benjamin's part,
and due process required his recusal.

Justice Benjamin countered that he was not biased
...because there was no direct financial or other connection
between him and Blankenship,
there was no obligation for him to recuse himself.

...The United States Supreme Court ...found for Caperton and Harman Mining...

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy called the appearance of a conflict of interest
so "extreme" that Benjamin's failure to recuse himself
constituted a violation of the plaintiff's Constitutional right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Kennedy noted that not every campaign contribution by a litigant
creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal.

Justice Kennedy wrote, "We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias
— based on objective and reasonable perceptions
— when a person with a personal stake in a particular case
had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign
when the case was pending or imminent."

"The inquiry," Justice Kennedy wrote, "centers on the contribution's relative size
in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign,
the total amount spent in the election,
and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election."

Applying that test, Justice Kennedy ruled for the Court
that "Blankenship's significant and disproportionate influence
—coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending case—"'
"offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge
to. . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."'

"On these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level."

...litigants have a due process right not to face a judge
whom a reasonable person may deem biased given his previously advertised views..."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caperton_v._A._T._Massey_Coal_Co.