One who intends to leave others better off for his having existed.

11/7/16

"Envision" Retirement Plans

Wells Fargo defrauded, recommitted and is currently committing fraud on thousands of Wells Fargo clients whose accounts are governed by The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 via misleading Envision financial plans without what clients are charged included, and goals lowered so Financial Advisors could qualify for the 4front incentive bonus' after the Wells Fargo Wachovia merger.

In 2009, while in possession of TARP monies, Wells Fargo initiated a pattern of the use of a device and scheme to defraud the U.S. government and clients with more than $250,000 held at Wells Fargo, by omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make statements made by hundreds if thousands of Envision plan reports delivered by wire and the mail, created by thousands of financial advisors, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading via the 4front Envision plan related financial advisor retention bonus program...in violation of federal laws.

This is how not one big executive didn't go to jail

Thousands of Wells Fargo clients are being lied to on their monthly statements

Many of the households whose accounts were/are governed under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 were used to get the 4front bonus', which makes it illegal, as Financial Advisors were compensated over and above what was disclosed to clients via the use of misleading information, by gaming plan goals and leaving out what clients are actually charged.

We lied to thousands of Wells Fargo clients
to make 'incentive' money over and above what we were charging clients

Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, …to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;  to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; or...  to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."

If about 10,000  Financial Advisors had to do a minimum of 25 Envision Investment Plans on households worth at least $250,000 to receive Wells Fargo 4Front compensation retention bonus' after Wells acquisition of Wachovia, and the average assets held by households that received 4Front Envision plans was/is about $450,000, and the average number of qualifying for 4Front Envision Plans was/is about 35 per Financial Advisor, and if about 10,000 FA's created about 35 plans each = 350,000 4Front Envision Plans, and about 350,000 x what could be about $450,000 of assets held for each household = $157,500,000,000, meaning it looks like it happened to more than $150 billion of Wells Fargo Advisors client assets, much of which was covered by fiduciary obligations under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which made the scheme illegal.

As a fiduciary, Wells Fargo is currently defrauding and recommitting fraud on what appears to be hundreds of thousands of clients, many with accounts governed by The Investment Advisors Act of 1940, via misleading Envision financial plans created to qualify for the 4front incentive bonus and updated without including charged investment costs in projected minimum client goals, which were gamed to qualify for 4front bonus'.

If the client's actual goal was too high,
we lowered the goal to make the financial plans qualify for 4front,
which made every single qualifying household show they were on their way to prosperity
and then made sure they stayed on their fake way every year after

I believe Wells Fargo violated the following laws;

29 U.S. Code § 1104 - Fiduciary duties

8 U.S. Code § 1343 - Fraud by wire, radio, or television

17 CFR 240.10b-5 - Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices

15 U.S. Code § 77q - Fraudulent interstate transactions

15 U.S. Code § 80a–35 - Breach of fiduciary duty

15 U.S. Code § 80a–47 - Liability of controlling persons; preventing compliance

15 U.S. Code § 80b–6 - Prohibited transactions by investment advisers

17 CFR 240.10b-3 - Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices by brokers or dealers

15 U.S. Code § 78t - Liability of controlling persons and persons who aid and abet violations

We employed a scheme to make money most of our clients didn't know about
by faking financial plans to qualify for a retention bonus
after the Wachovia Wells Fargo merger

I worked as a financial advisor from 1993 to 2015, and have taught CPA and attorney financial ethics in North Carolina for more than a decade.

On February 20, 2009, taxpayer bailed out Citigroup’s Morgan Stanley Smith Barney announced about a $2 to $3 billion retention plan to retain their securities brokers.  The same day, Wachovia Securities announced the firm's brokers would not receive a retention bonus, but financial advisors could receive payouts from its 4front program, which involved creating "Envision" investment/financial plans for current clients.

Janet Levaux of Advisor One reported “For 4front, advisors must complete financial plans using the company's Envision software for at least 25 households with $250,000 in assets under management...This makes our company a compelling place for advisors to stay and run their business," said Wachovia Securities spokesperson Anthony Mattera.  Halah Touryalai of Wealth Management.com reported “...the firm takes a “snapshot” to look at how many households and assets advisors have in Envision Plans. The more households and assets with “Envision Plans,” the larger the bonus a rep can receive.”

I chose not to apply/qualify for 4front until U.S. taxpayers were paid back money loaned through TARP.  When the first round of Envision plans were created, word came down from executive management imploring our office to not create too many Envision plans at the same time to keep up appearances.


Many Wells Fargo Envision Plans created to earn 4front bonuses did not include investment fees.  On September 7, 2012, in front of 25 to 40 financial advisors at the Hyatt Regency St. Louis at The Arch, Greg Shiveley, Envision Sales Manager at Wells Fargo Advisors, said “There are 441,942 households with Envision Plans of Record.” and “The overwhelming majority of Envision Plans do not include investment costs."  One reason so many Wells Fargo households have Envision Plans of Record (POR), was to avoid negative press coverage by obscuring retention bonuses after the company received overt and covert taxpayer bailouts.  If the average household with an Envision Plan had $400,000, about $177 billion of client assets may be involved.  If “the overwhelming majority of Envision Plans [did and] do not include investment costs,” and Plans of Record appear on client statements, hundreds of thousands of Wells Fargo clients are currently being illegally misinformed as to the probabilities of achieving their financial goals.



I violated my fiduciary responsibilities to clients with advisory accounts by not including investment fees in their Envision plans, along with thousands of other Wells Fargo Financial Advisors.  Wachovia Securities executives who visited the Greensboro’s 3623 North Elm Street Branch told a meeting of brokers that the retention program tied to Envision investment plans was set up to avoid critical press reports about TARP being money used to “retain” financial advisers.  We were told “do the plans and get paid.”

Envision plans can be manipulated to sell clients and prospects on new investment ideas, staying on a current course with a financial adviser, and with the "retention" plan, game compensation in violation of Investment Advisers Act of 1940.


These outcomes are repeatable, meaning this can be duplicated on any Wells Fargo Advisors computer by others investigating independently.

The following “Internal Use Only” document states: "If left at 0%, the Return Discount Rate will not be displayed on any Envision report pages.  If you choose a Return Discount Rate above 0%, this assumption will be displayed on the Investment Plan Assumptions report page."  Meaning if the "Return Discount Rate", otherwise known as annual investment fees aren't included, the information does not show up in the client presentation, even though inflation, tax and turnover measures do.


As shown after the third main bullet point below, "Return Discount Rate" was called “Annual Investment Fee” before 2012.



Example: Harold Lynn

The following shows a comparison of two reproducible versions of the same Wells Fargo Envision Plan with one difference - investment fees.



"Harold Lynn" has $1,000,000 invested, with an annual investment fee of 2.5%.

Both versions have the same data inputs, except the second plan doesn't include the investment fees, like "the overwhelming majority of Envision Plans.”  The first plan includes 2.5% annual investment fees, which Harold is currently paying.

Again, Investment fees are not shown on client presentations unless entered, as seen on the following pages, even though both presentations include everything else.  Notice "Return Discount Rate" under "Investment Assumptions"


Note the absence of the “Return Discount Rate” under the description of “Investment Assumptions” in the second version of the plan.


Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, …to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;  to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; or...  to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."

Without the investment fees included for Harold’s $1,000,000, Envision's software can generate the following client compliance approved graph indicating a high degree of wonderfulness if Harold continues to follow the recommendations.


The problem is the Envision Plan including what Harold is actually paying for his investments, is that he would need to begin with about $840,000 more to achieve similar results, meaning the plan not including the 2.5% annual investment fees clearly appears to be misleading.

As long at the dots were above the bottom line
which could be completely manipulated,
thousands of Financial Advisers betrayed their clients
to qualify for an incentive bonus


The black dot on the Y axis of the charts indicates Harold's $1,000,000.

The two rising lines represent the “Target Zone”, which the software identifies as a “reasonable level of confidence that goals can be met or exceeded”, which usually wasn't true when we qualified for 4front

The lowest lines in the graphs represent a 75% chance of reaching Harold’s goal.

The lines are much higher on the bottom graph when investment fees are included.

Please give FINRA and the SEC a call 
and ask them why they are okay with Wells Fargo lying to their clients
in order for their financial advisors to qualify for a retention bonus

Wells Fargo Advisor's Internal Use Only "Presenting Envision results that matter" states "If the client has any doubts about the underlying assumptions, Advisors should be prepared to provide clarity and rationale. Observe that this is based on “IF” the client has doubts about assumptions, which means advisors do not need to burden clients with a detailed explanation of the assumptions if they are not in doubt of your ability to understand their goals and priorities." and "If the client asks you how their confidence is measured, this will require a careful explanation but it should not be focused on mathematics. Instead, the focus should be on the results of the math."  And "If you fall into the red, above target zone, you are making needless sacrifices to your lifestyle...," meaning some clients may be spending more than they "should", if investment fees are not included in Envision plan target zone calculations.

The "Internal Use Only" document (0211-5064) also states "Although it may be unintended and clearly disclosed away, this report will serve as a guarantee (in the eyes of the client) of how reality should unfold. It illustrates what they should have in taxable assets in 2013, their tax bill in 2015 and their net portfolio withdrawal in 2020. No matter how many disclosures that are made, how else would you perceive this report if you were a client?" and "With the Envision process, the job is to focus on what matters: the client’s confidence and comfort in achieving the goals they value most. Presenting results that matter is what creates the confidence and comfort the client desires."

4front

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say  “For credit in the 4front program, the Financial Advisor must designate an Envision profile in the Household as the [Envision Plan of Record] (POR).  This will identify the profile that was presented by the Financial Advisor and accepted by the client.  This requires that the plan reflects the client’s goals and risk tolerance, that it remains within the Target Zone...or has been within or above the Target Zone within the past 12 months...”

For many Wells Fargo Advisers, there was no way to both get the bonus and include investment costs.  I qualified with 27 households.  The minimum was 25.

To qualify for the 4front "retention" bonus, the black dot had to be above the bottom blue line, meaning the plan without investment fees would have qualified, while the other plan including fees wouldn't, meaning in overwhelmingly most cases, there was no way to both get the bonus and include investment fees.

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say “The Envision Plan of Record (POR) review is a standard part of the Envision process and of 4front...  Prior to granting a 4front Level One award, PORs will be reviewed to ensure that they have been presented to the client, reflect the client’s current goals and priorities, and have been or are in the process of being implemented.”

FINRA Rule 2210 states "All member communications must be based on principles of fair dealing and good faith, must be fair and balanced, and must provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular...service.  No member may omit any material fact or qualification if the omission, in light of the context of the material presented, would cause the communications to be misleading.  No member may make any false, exaggerated, unwarranted, promissory or misleading statement or claim in any communication.  No member may publish, circulate or distribute any communication that the member knows or has reason to know contains any untrue statement of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading.”

If “The overwhelming majority of Envision Plans do not include investment costs," I believe many of the 98% of Wells Fargo Envision Plan clients cited in this advertisement really don’t know where they stand in reaching their financial goals.


FINRA Rule 2210 also states “Information may be placed in a legend or footnote only in the event that such placement would not inhibit an investor's understanding of the communication.  Members must ensure that statements are clear and not misleading within the context in which they are made, and that they provide balanced treatment of risks and potential benefits.  ...Members must consider the nature of the audience to which the communication will be directed and must provide details and explanations appropriate to the audience.  Communications may not predict or project performance, ...or make any exaggerated or unwarranted claim, opinion or forecast...  Any comparison in retail communications between investments or services must disclose all material differences between them, including (as applicable) investment objectives, costs and expenses..."

Recommitting Fraud

Wells Fargo Advisors mandated Envision Plans of Record be updated annually, forcing thousands of Advisers who didn't include investment fees to repetitively recommit fraud upon their clients in later years.  Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say “To receive credit for the review/update of an existing plan, you must …conduct a thorough review of client goals and account information, ensure that everything is up to date and that your advice is current.   If you discover that changes are needed, simply update the information, review accuracy and ensure that your advice is current and the plan is within or above the Target Zone.  A new Client Presentation or Progress Report must be generated with the past 12 months...[and] the plan is presented to the client and reviewed on at least an annual basis”, the results of which show up on client statements.

One of my assistants agreed to create the Envision Plans for the bonus.  The next year she agreed to update them.  In September 2012, I couldn't ask her to do it again after internally and externally whistleblowing and receiving the following email;

"From: PCG Administration;  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:45 PM To: Hartzman, George;  Subject: 4front Level One Long Term Standard of Care - August 2012 Status - Hartzman, George H - A254477;  Importance: High 
…As previously communicated, FAs who received a 4front Level One award are responsible for maintaining the same level of retail planning and institutional service as awarded through the Level One award program.  …As part of the 4front Level One Award, FAs are responsible for maintaining the Long-term Standard of Care (LTSC) requirements.  …requiring FAs to maintain the same level of client POR planning…  
…Each year for the duration of the 4front Level One program, the firm will review FAs’ Long-term Standard of Care based on a snapshot of client households. (The 2012 annual snapshot will take place on Oct. 31 [2012])  There is no grace period; therefore, FAs should ensure they are tracking their level of planning throughout the year…”

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents also say “...The Financial Adviser must keep their plans updated and continue serving their clients.  On an ongoing basis, the plans will be reviewed ...and the plan must be continually adjusted so that it will keep the client on track towards achieving their goals. (This is measured by looking at whether the plan is within or above the Target Zone...)”  Wells Fargo could also “cancel existing awards” and terminate for “failure to adhere to the guidelines”

Section 36 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "The Commission is authorized to bring an action...alleging that a person ...is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts, or at the time of the alleged misconduct, so served or acted — as ...investment adviser...”

But they didn't

“...the investment adviser … shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company… to such investment adviser…  An action may be brought … by the Commission...against such investment adviser... who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company...to such investment adviser or person.  …It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty."

I have chosen to speak out for my clients, family, students, country and colleagues, instead of living out a fraud.

George Hartzman
Former Vice President/Investments
Fundamental Choice Portfolio Manager, Wells Fargo Advisors

Addendum

This journey began by providing an external email address and phone number to Wells Fargo's confidential ethics hot line, after which I was contacted on multiple occasions by investigators on my company email and phone.  Realizing my anonymity was compromised and my family’s safety at risk, I took the issues to my local manager, after which Wells Fargo's executive management enlisted an outside ‘independent’ investigator who promptly found no merit to my assertions.  Thinking I could mitigate personal risk by contacting regulatory authorities, I filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) DC Office of the Whistleblower which went nowhere.  I then filed with the NC Secretary of State Securities Division, who investigated and referred files to Atlanta's SEC and FINRA offices.  The financial plan/bonus matter went back to FINRA’s DC Office of the Whistleblower from Atlanta and on to Kansas City's FINRA regional office, where Wells Fargo Advisors home office is located.  And then nothing.  American regulatory authorities will not say whether a case exists or if a case is opened or closed, even though I contacted the government during and after interactions with Wells Fargo management, leaving myself and loved ones at risk of reprisal.

My employment at Wells Fargo Advisors was terminated on Monday, October 8, 2012 in direct retaliation for disseminating whistleblower information that our regulatory infrastructure seems unwilling to act upon and our mass media won’t report.  My “U5” states “Termination Explanation: Violation of the firm’s policies, including policies prohibiting the disclosure of the firm’s proprietary and/or internal use only information”.

10/12/16

Dear George Hartzman,

Thank you for your submission.

Your article has been selected for publication on Seeking Alpha.

You can see it live here: Wells Fargo, Wachovia, And The Fed.

A link to your article will be sent to 36,109 investors as a real-time email alert.

http://seekingalpha.com/article/4011628-wells-fargo-wachovia-fed

10/3/16

Wells Fargo Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

1. In 2008 and 2009, unknown to shareholders and the public but known to Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf among others, Wells Fargo borrowed from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank's (FED) Term Auction Facility (TAF), representing massive, material undisclosed loans and a credit line with the FED, details of which were not disclosed within Wells Fargo's 2008 and 2009 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and Wachovia merger related litigation pleadings.

2. Unencumbered Collateral, representing assets free and clear of any encumbrances such as creditor claims or liens, showed that Wells Fargo had an unreported FED credit line worth tens of billions (far right column);

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

3. Wells Fargo's 2008 era Annual Reports;

https://www.wellsfargohistory.com/archives/annual-reports/wells-fargo-three/

Search for "Term Auction" results for 2008 = Zero.

Search for "Discount Window", which Wachovia borrowed from before merging with Wells Fargo on October 6, 2008 results = Zero.

Search for “TAF” results for 2008 = “Staff”

4. Wells Fargo's 2008 annual report certified by John Stumpf, didn’t disclose the overall size of FED’s TAF credit lines, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of U.S. Government provided financial assistance in violation of SEC and Sarbanes Oxley (SARBOX) reporting laws.

5. In an interview on Tuesday, June 10, 2008, after Wells Fargo borrowed billions from the FED’s TAF, representing 15.27% of the company's market capitalization, John Stumpf stated "I have a general aversion to using public money, our citizen's money, to bail out problems for a particular sector" and "...in our company's case, to be able to not only pay for the credit hits we took, we actually added to our reserves" and "We added organically to capital", which wasn’t’ true.

http://www.marketplace.org/2008/06/10/business/interview-transcript-john-stumpf

6. In March, 2009, Senator Bernie Sanders website reported "During the worst financial crisis in our nation's history since the Great Depression - a crisis which has led to the largest taxpayer bailout ever - the very least we can do is explain to the American people what the Federal Reserve is doing with their hard-earned taxpayer dollars," Sanders said.  At a Senate Budget Committee hearing on March 3 [2009], Sanders asked Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to name the hundreds of banks that took money since the financial crisis began.  Bernanke refused to name any of the financial institutions and would not say what the banks are doing with the money.  Sanders noted that a separate $700 billion financial rescue package that was signed into law last October requires the Treasury Department to identify recipients of bailout funds.

http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=531a8de5-e7db-4dc9-a126-6d1d1285178f

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCWXrMCGJT4

7. On December 21, 2011, after the FED was forced to reveal who got what, then Wells Fargo Executive Vice President and Controller Richard D. Levy responded to an inquiry by the SEC's Stephanie L. Hunsaker stated "We have become aware through various news reports that you may have accessed various Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sponsored funding programs during 2008 and 2009, including the Term Auction Facility (TAF)..." And "you do not appear to have provided any discussion about certain other programs that were in existence at this time, such as the TAF…”

8. If the SEC became aware through the news that Wells Fargo borrowed billions from the FED, Wells Fargo didn't report material information to the SEC in filings certified by John Stumpf.

9. Wells Fargo’s response stated "We did participate in the Term Auction Facility (TAF) during 2008 through August 2009." And "At December 31, 2008, our short-term borrowings under TAF totaled $72.5 billion, which included $40 billion of TAF borrowings by Wachovia Corporation at the time of acquisition.  However, the TAF borrowings were classified differently in the legacy Wells Fargo and Wachovia accounting systems..., which resulted in our reporting of $32.5 billion of the TAF borrowings in the “Commercial paper and other short-term borrowings” line item, and the $40 billion of Wachovia TAF borrowings reported in the “Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase” line item of Note 13 (Short-Term Borrowings) in our 2008 Form 10-K.  Despite the accounting systems difference, our management did not distinguish TAF from other sources of short-term borrowings [GH; meaning both company’s accounting was combined for the fourth quarter of 2008, as there was no Wachovia 2008 annual report]" and “nor did we access the Federal Reserve’s discount window for liquidity purposes during 2008 and 2009”, yet Wachovia did.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312511349117/filename1.htm

Wells Fargo Insider Trading

10. After borrowing $1.6 billion from TAF on January 17, 2008 with a $47.9 billion FED credit line, John Stumpf exorcised 68,980 shares of Wells Fargo stock worth $2,077,815.  On May 5, 2008, Stumpf bought 1,550 shares of Wells Fargo worth 44,841 and was not charged for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud.

On June 6, 2008, while Wells Fargo was in possession of undisclosed FED TAF loans, former Wells Chairman Richard M. Kovacevich purchased 40,398 of Wells Fargo stock valued at $1,052,367 and was not charged for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud.

http://www.insider-monitor.com/trading/cik72971-3.html

11. During 2008, Wells Fargo stock option related insider transactions also involved Atkins Howard I (Senior Executive VP & CFO), Milligan Cynthia (Director), White Julie M (Executive Vice President), Runstad Judith M (Director), Swenson Susan (Director), Quigley Philip (Director), Oman Mark C (Sr. Executive Vice President), Tolstedt Carrie L (Sr. Executive Vice President) and Loughlin Michael J (Executive Vice President).  See above link.

Wachovia

12. Before arriving on July 9, 2008 as CEO of Wachovia, Robert Steel was in a ‘need to know position’ of massive undisclosed material FED borrowing as Under Secretary for Domestic Finance of the United States Treasury under former Goldman Sachs colleague Hank Paulson.

13. On March 31, 2011, Bloomberg reported “During the financial crisis and prior to the Wells Fargo merger while still an independent company [GH; but after the merger with Wells Fargo was announced on October 3, 2008], Wachovia borrowed and repaid funds from the discount window,” Mary Eshet, spokeswoman for San Francisco-based Wells Fargo, said..." unmentioned in Controller Richard D. Levy's December 21, 2011 response to an inquiry by the SEC's Stephanie L. Hunsaker without consequence in item 9.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-31/wachovia-held-29-billion-in-fed-s-discount-window-borrowing

On April 4, 2011, Bloomberg reported "Wachovia Corp. was the only U.S. bank among the top five discount-window borrowers as the crisis peaked.  The company, based in Charlotte, North Carolina, borrowed $29 billion from the discount window on Oct. 6, in the week after it almost collapsed, the data show. …The Wells Fargo deal closed at the end of 2008.  Wells Fargo spokeswoman Mary Eshet declined to comment on Wachovia’s discount-window borrowing" after commenting on Wachovia’s discount window borrowing on March 31, 2011.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-01/foreign-banks-tapped-fed-s-lifeline-most-as-bernanke-kept-borrowers-secret

14. On October 31, 2008, WELLS FARGO & COMPANY FORM S-4 REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, which prominently listed James M. Strother, Esq., Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Wells Fargo, stated; "Liquidity continued to decline and by the end of September 26, Wachovia’s management was concerned that, without accessing the Federal Reserve’s discount borrowing window, Wachovia’s banking subsidiaries would not be able to fund normal banking activities on Monday, September 29. Wachovia had been regularly reviewing its liquidity situation with the Federal Reserve and the OCC, who on that day remained on site." after Wachovia borrowed $12.5 billion from the FED’s Term Auction Facility and $29 billion from the FED’s discount window on October 6, 2008, violating security reporting laws on October 31, 2008, by not disclosing the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of federal financial assistance provided by the FED, in violation of SEC and Sarbanes Oxley reporting laws.  The FED’s Discount Window data for 2008 is missing from their website.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000095012308013965/y72243sv4.htm

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_discount_window.htm

15.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

16. On March 27, 2008, Wachovia borrowed an undisclosed $3.5 billion from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility with $65.8 billion in Unencumbered Assets, which showed Wachovia had a massive unreported Federal Reserve material liquid credit line bigger than Wells Fargo’s.

17. On 6/30/2008, Wachovia's outstanding Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility borrowings totaled $10 billion, representing a material 29.82% of the company's market capitalization.

18. Wachovia Corporation's June 30, 2008 form 10-Q certified by Robert Steel did not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of federal financial assistance provided by the FED’s TAF.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36995/000095014408006316/g14577qe10vq.htm

19. On July 22, 2008, Mr. Steel personally purchased 1,000,000 shares of Wachovia’s stock, among others and without consequence, as Wachovia’ undisclosed Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (TAF) borrowing reached $12.5 billion, representing a material 34.85% of the company's market capitalization.

http://www.insider-monitor.com/trading/cik36995.html

20. In an interview with CNBC's Jim Cramer On Monday, September 15, 2008, Robert Steel said "I think it's really about...transparency.  People have to understand the assets and really be able to say, this is what I own" and "Complete disclosure" and "we can work through this with transparency, liquidity and capital" and "Our strategy was to give you all the data" and "we're raising capital ourselves by basically shrinking the balance sheet, cutting the dividend, cutting expenses.  We can create more capital ourselves that way", which wasn't true.

After Jim Cramer asked "Should there be any sort of quick regulatory relief from the SEC that would make life easier to be able to make your bank much stronger?", Mr. Steel lied when he responded "I don't think it's about my bank", which wasn't true, as the SEC and FED allowed violations of SARBOX reporting requirements by both Wells Fargo and Wachovia among others for Steel to have been able to make the statement without being charged for insider trading and securities fraud.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/26728133#

21. On 9/25/2008, when Wachovia borrowed an undisclosed $5 billion from the FED's TAF, Wachovia’s unreported credit line was $56.8 billion.

22. Wachovia Corporation's form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 certified by Robert Steel, did not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of financial assistance provided by the FED and other material terms.

The SEC filing misled shareholders and violated securities laws when it stated "I, Robert K. Steel, certify that:  I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 of Wachovia Corporation;  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report."

http://www.taxpayer.net/user_uploads/file/Bailout/BankBios/WellsFargo/Finance/WACHOVIACORP%2010Q%203rd%20qtr%202008.pdf

23. An October 3, 2008 "Statement from Wells Fargo and Wachovia" states "Wells Fargo & Company (NYSE:WFC) and Wachovia Corporation (NYSE:WB) said today they have signed a definitive agreement for the merger of the two companies including all of Wachovia's banking operations in a whole company transaction requiring no financial assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other government agency", which wasn’t true.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-10-03/statement-from-wells-fargo-and-wachoviabusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice

24. The FED unanimously approved Wachovia's merger with Wells Fargo on October 12, 2008 as Wachovia's FED TAF and Discount Window borrowings were a material 449.72% of Wachovia’s market capitalization.

25. Federal employees at the FED, SEC and FDIC must have known Wachovia and Wells Fargo CEO's Robert Steel and John Stumpf did not disclose FED TAF and Discount Window borrowings in merger related SEC filings and Wells Fargo’s 2008 annual report, after the merger.

26. Wachovia’s market capitalization lost about $42.672 billion between the first undisclosed TAF loan borrowing with a $65.4 billion credit line and the Wells Fargo merger.

27. On November 17, 2008, Robinson Bradshaw's Robert Fuller filed a BRIEF OF DEFENDANT WACHOVIA CORPORATION AND OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS OPPOSING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION in defense of the Wells Fargo Wachovia merger which stated; "In the three-week period prior to October 3, Wachovia experienced an acute liquidity crisis that, ...placed Wachovia on the brink of receivership" without disclosing Wachovia's available FED borrowings and credit lines.  And "Without the Wells merger, Wachovia either had to pursue a sale of assets ... or go into FDIC receivership and suffer a complete and certain loss of its shareholders' equity." without disclosing Wachovia's available FED credit lines.  And "financial market participants, depositors, and other counterparties had begun refusing to deal with Wachovia" after Wachovia's Robert Steel didn't disclose the firm's available FED credit lines.  And "The merger agreement had the desired effect of providing assurance to third parties that allowed Wachovia to obtain access to capital and recover stability" after Wachovia's Robert Steel and Wells Fargo’s John Stumpf failed to disclose Wachovia’s or Wells Fargo’s FED borrowing or available access to capital via FED credit lines.  And "Despite diligent, persistent, and continuous efforts after the board meeting on September 16 to raise capital, sell assets ... Wachovia had been unable to reach any definitive agreement with a third party that would allow Wachovia to resolve its liquidity issues and avoid FDIC receivership" while Wachovia was in possession of an undisclosed FED credit line totaling $56.838 billion, which Robert Steel was aware of and John Stumpf should have been.

28. On December 31, 2008, Wachovia had no borrowings from the Fed's Discount Window, and $40 billion in borrowings from the TAF, while Wells Fargo borrowed $32.5 billion from the TAF, totaling a material $72.5 billion borrowed on the eve of a merger transaction executives from both companies said no government agencies were involved in, which wasn't true.

29. Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf knew and proceeded with the merger, signing false SEC certifications in the process.

30. After the Wachovia merger, Wells Fargo's 2008 annual report certified by John Stumpf, didn’t disclose Wachovia’s Discount Window borrowing, TAF or the overall size of FED’s TAF loans and credit lines, interest rates and maturities, all of which were material inside information known to Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Wachovia CEO Robert Steel, but few others.

31. An example of what Wachovia and Wells Fargo should have disclosed in Zions Bancorporation's fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 form 10-k, which states; "In December 2007, the Federal Reserve Board announced a new program, the Term Auction Facility (“TAF”), to make 28 day loans to banks in the United States and to foreign banks through foreign central banks. These loans are made using an auction process. Zions Bank is currently participating in the TAF and may continue to do so as long as money can be borrowed at an attractive rate. The amount that can be borrowed is based upon the amount of collateral that has been pledged to the Federal Reserve Bank. At December 31, 2008, $1.8 billion in borrowings were outstanding under this program as compared to $450 million at December 31, 2007. However, by February 13, 2009, the TAF borrowings outstanding had been reduced to $500 million. At December 31, 2008, the amount available for additional Federal Reserve borrowings was approximately $4.3 billion, which had increased to $5.7 billion by February 13, 2009. An additional $1.3 billion could be borrowed at December 31, 2008 upon the pledging of additional available collateral.

At December 31, 2008, the Company’s subsidiary banks had a total of $13.1 billion of immediately available, unused borrowing capacity at the Fed and various FHLBs, which had increased to $14.3 billion as of February 13, 2009."

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/109380/000119312509040927/d10k.htm

32. On February 17, 2016, I survived a motion to dismiss in a federal court as a pro se litigant which implicates John Stumpf and other Wells Fargo executives with false SEC certifications, securities fraud and insider trading during the financial crisis.

The “MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; OSTEEN, JR., District Judge; GEORGE HARTZMAN, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, Defendant; 1:14CV808” states I have an "objectively reasonable belief" that John Stumpf and Robert Steel violated securities laws;

“…Defendant also alleges that the SEC at some point inquired about these SEC filings, citing to a letter between Wells Fargo and the SEC. (Id. ¶ 21.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges both that the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State found enough merit to his concerns on this issue to refer them to FINRA and the SEC, and former SEC officials who were interviewed about the issue found plausible violations among his concerns.

...the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden of pleading an objectively reasonable belief regarding Wells Fargo’s alleged failure to include the receipt of federal monies in its SEC filings...

...Plaintiff has alleged enough to show the objective reasonableness of his concerns.  If financial experts and the SEC itself were concerned about the materiality of these non-disclosures and possible violations of the securities laws, it is contrary to reason to find it unreasonable for Plaintiff to have believed they were violations as well.  As such, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged that he had an objectively reasonable belief that these actions constituted a violation of the law..."



33. After paying former Goldman Sachs colleague Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Robert Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

9/30/16

Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, Wachovia and Perella Weinberg Story

On February 17, 2016 as a pro se litigant, I survived a motion to dismiss in a federal court which implicates many Wall Street execs with false SEC certifications, securities fraud and insider trading during the financial crisis .

Wachovia's shareholders were misled, including perjury on a North Carolina business court.

I can provide documentation of the following;

In 2008 and 2009, Wachovia borrowed billions from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) with an undisclosed and underutilized  Federal Reserve credit line worth more than $50 Billion.

After working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 and serving with Hank Paulson at the US Treasury Department, former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleague Peter Weinberg and Goldman Sachs, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission split between Perella Weinberg Partners and Goldman Sachs, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive undisclosed Federal Reserve credit lines.

As Wells Fargo also borrowed from the same Term Auction Facility with a massive undisclosed credit line, both Steel and Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf illegally traded their company's stocks with inside information and falsely certified SEC and merger related court filings.

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel then earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth and misleading a North Carolina Business Court without consequence, costing Wachovia shareholders including North Carolina's pension plan more than $42 billion.

6/2/16

A User’s Guide to Hartzman’s Inquisitions


The following is a most recent culmination of thought that has provided a way to discover how to navigate my life, and I offer it as a vehicle for others to find answers to questions they may or may not have thought of. If what others think is true may not be what you do, interpretations should differ.

Thoughts of the past and future are dependent on existing in the present.

If we think, we are. We were who we think we were. We are what we think we are.

If nothing changes, we may or may not be who we think we’ll be.

If what was, is, or will be is uncertain, the only certainty appears to be present thought.

We may not actually know some of what we think we know.

What we don’t know we don’t know is more than we think.

What is may have been before the beginning, and may still be after the end.

Some of what we need, we don’t know or can’t choose to do, like hunger or thirst.

To exist in the present, we must have acquired enough need in the past to make it happen.

Need appears to be thought, sustenance, hygiene and a temperate climate.

Threatened need alters thought.

The less you think you need, the easier it is to take care of.

Want is everything else, but you have to acquire need to get it.

Over-prioritizing present want can sacrifice future need.

In want is not how much but how happy, Wealth = Happiness If want depends non purposefully not understanding need, what looks obtainable may not be.

Want can be eliminating unneeded.

In time, we “do” in the present, so doing nothing is choosing to do something.

Creating a higher likelihood of a better present by securing need and achieving want in the shortest time with the least risk, by thinking of what to don and when, relative to what was and what could happen after what may happen next.

If thought is both logical and emotional, what we do is too.

If what we think was derived from choice or influence, what we think is may not be.

If emotion occurs before thought, reaction can precede comprehension.

Some of what we think we know, we don’t.

Don’t think you need want, want what you can’t get, or think you know what you don’t.

What to do should be an optimal point between need and want.

There may be less risk and greater return in learning from other people’s mistakes before having to learn from your own.

If there’s less risk and higher return in a plan fitting circumstances, than circumstances fitting a plan; acknowledge, adjust and overcome.

If not thinking isn’t, it’s not about what could’ve been or what may someday, it’s about what we do now.

Have as much fun as soon as possible, with the least amount of risk for as long as you can.

http://yesweekly.com/article-18056-a-user%25E2%2580%2599s-guide-to-hartzman%25E2%2580%2599s-inquisitions.html

2/19/16

Winston Salem Journal's Richard Craver; "Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision"

from: Craver, Richard N.
to: "hartzman
date: Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM
subject: Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision
mailed-by: wsjournal.com
.
.
from: George Hartzman
to: "Craver, Richard N."
date: Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:23 PM
subject: Re: Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision
mailed-by: gmail.com

In 2008 and 2009, Wachovia borrowed billions from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) with an undisclosed and underutilized  Federal Reserve credit line worth more than $50 Billion.

After working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 and serving with Hank Paulson at the US Treasury Department, former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel and Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleauge Peter Weinberg and Goldman Sachs, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission split between Perella Weinberg Partners and Goldman Sachs, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive undisclosed Federal Reserve credit lines.

Both Steel and Stumpf signed false SEC certifications and oversaw misleading and inaccurate court filings in the process, as Wells Fargo also borrowed from the same Term Auction Facility with a massive undisclosed credit line.

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO, after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth and misleading a North Carolina Business Court without consequence, costing Wachovia shareholders more than $42 billion.

Now that I have survived Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss litigating by and for myself, I am now looking for legal representation.

g

2/17/16

"MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; OSTEEN, JR., District Judge; GEORGE HARTZMAN, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, Defendant; 1:14CV808"

"...This matter is now ripe for resolution, and for the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 22, 2014, by filing a complaint alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for reporting Defendant’s allegedly fraudulent practices, in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).

...Plaintiff alleges that, while employed by Defendant, he raised “federal criminal concerns” through a confidential company ethics reporting channel.

...On November 29, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Accounting Irregularities,” which included “concerns raised about accounting, internal accounting controls, and auditing matters.” (Id.) On December 2, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Falsification of Company Records,” which apparently concerned the “accuracy and completeness of corporate financial reports.” (Id.) Finally, on December 3, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Auditing Irregularities,” wherein he quoted Wells Fargo’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, which states that: "All business transactions . . . must be properly and accurately recorded . . . in accordance with applicable accounting standards, legal requirements, and Wells Fargo’s system of internal controls. Falsification of any company . . . information is prohibited. Falsification refers to knowingly misstating, . . . or omitting or deleting information from a Wells Fargo record or system which results in something that is untrue, fraudulent or misleading."

...While it is difficult to glean from the pleadings the exact nature of Plaintiff’s concerns, they apparently boil down to an allegation that Wells Fargo violated its Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) reporting requirements by omitting from its filings that it had received (or, at minimum, by omitting the size and source of) what Plaintiff refers to as “secret loans” from the Federal Reserve... 5 ...These loans are apparently funds that Wells Fargo received access to under the federal Term Auction Facility during the financial crisis.

...At some point after Plaintiff raised these concerns, Wells Fargo apparently hired an outside consulting firm, Oyster Consulting, LLC (“Oyster”), to investigate his claims. (See id. ¶¶ 14-21.) Plaintiff contends that this report, which concludes both that Plaintiff’s complaints were given a fair hearing by Wells Fargo and that his complaints were without merit both as to Wells Fargo’s financial
statements and as to the Envision Reports, is essentially a sham... 6 ...Plaintiff’s contentions regarding this report range from complaints that Oyster never interviewed anyone outside of Wells Fargo other than “shills” of the alleged con to allegations that the report was “withheld” from him in violation of SarbanesOxley and RICO.

...After the investigation began, Plaintiff continued to raise his concerns with Wells Fargo internally, both by repeatedly attempting to follow up with the individuals in charge of his original ethics line complaints and by sending emails to multiple executives at Wells Fargo on March 4, 2012, including Danny Ludeman, the CEO of Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, and John Stumpf, the CEO of Wells Fargo & Co. (Id. ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff was told to keep his communications regarding his concerns limited to the Ethics Line, (id. ¶ 41), and was told that he needed to cease his activities on several occasions, including by email on January 4, 2012, and January 19, 2012.

...Plaintiff also at some point apparently posted information about his concerns on his personal blog and began raising these issues during teaching events, because he was told in mid-June of 2012 both to cancel any future events and to take down his blog.

...Title VIII of SOX is designated as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. Section 806 of this Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, provides “whistleblower”  protection to employees of publicly traded companies. SOX prohibits retaliation against an employee who “provide[s] information, cause[s] information to be provided, or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes” mail, wire, or securities fraud, a violation of any rule or regulation of the SEC, or a violation of any federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1).

...Plaintiff essentially contends that he “blew the whistle” on two situations: (1) that Defendant failed to include certain funds received from the Federal Reserve (the “secret loans”) in their SEC filings from 2008 and 2009, and (2) that Defendant’s Envision Reports failed to include client costs in their projections, allegedly constituting mail, wire, and/or securities fraud.

...it does not appear that Plaintiff’s subjective belief about his allegations is in question. Although it is an extremely close issue as to the sufficiency of both the specificity and plausibility of Plaintiff’s allegations on this issue, the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden of pleading an objectively reasonable belief regarding Wells Fargo’s alleged failure to include the receipt of federal monies in its SEC filings. The strength and veracity of those pleadings will be determined at a later stage.

...Plaintiff alleges that Defendant submitted Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 certifications that did not include “unencumbered collateral pledged on December 20, 2007, at the beginning of Defendant’s first [Federal Reserve] offered Term Auction Facility (TAF) loan” which Plaintiff alleges represents a massive undisclosed credit line that was not properly disclosed in Defendant’s SEC filings.

 Defendant also alleges that the SEC at some point inquired about these SEC filings, citing to a letter between Wells Fargo and the SEC. (Id. ¶ 21.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges both that the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State found enough merit to his concerns on this issue to refer them to FINRA and the SEC, and former SEC officials who were interviewed about the issue found plausible violations among his concerns. (Id. ¶ 86.) Taking his allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged that: (1) Defendant received large low-interest loans from the Government; (2) those loans were not disclosed as required in their SEC filings; and (3) other financial experts saw these facts as a problem. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 21, 86.) At this stage, Plaintiff has alleged enough to show the objective reasonableness of his concerns. If financial experts and the SEC itself were concerned about the materiality of these nondisclosures and possible violations of the securities laws, it is contrary to reason to find it unreasonable for Plaintiff to have believed they were violations as well. As such, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged that he had an objectively reasonable belief that these actions constituted a violation of the law.

...There appears to be no dispute as to the second and third elements that Plaintiff must allege, namely that: (1) Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s protected activity, and (2) Plaintiff suffered an adverse personnel decision when he was given a formal warning and ultimately terminated. As such, the only remaining relevant inquiry is whether or not Plaintiff’s reporting of these believed violations was a “contributing factor” in that adverse personnel decision. See Livingston, 520 F.3d at 351-52.

...There is nothing in the record showing the internal process used to terminate Plaintiff, or any document or affidavit detailing the rationale behind that decision.

...Plaintiff initially brought his claims to Wells Fargo in late November and early December of 2011. (See Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 36) ¶ 13). Plaintiff then continued to pursue these claims internally despite first being told that his complaints were being investigated and finally being given instructions to stop raising the issue. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 52.) The report from the internal investigation that Wells Fargo commissioned was finalized on July 23, 2012. (Id. ¶ 44.) That same day, Plaintiff was issued a “Final Warning.”

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 36) is DISMISSED as to all claims except for his claim for retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley, specifically as it relates to his raising of concerns regarding whether government loans were properly disclosed in Wells Fargo’s SEC filings from 2008 and 2009.

This the 17th day of February, 2016.

WILLIAM OSTEEN, JR."

2/16/16

Too Connected to Jail; The Short, Short Version

Former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleauge Peter Weinberg, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission of which Goldman Sachs recieved half of, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive Federal Reserve credit lines, with the help of key Bush and Obama administration personel.

Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf knew and went along with the merger, signing false SEC certifications in the process.

The following was filed with the Middle District of North Carolina United States District Court on December 3, 2014 in an Amended Complaint;

https://casetext.com/briefs/E5uSKe_lC40RKJR2UOBB6LJc50s.
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Robert Steel served as Under Secretary for Domestic Finance of the United States Treasury under Hank Paulson until October 10, 2006, before becoming CEO of Wachovia on July 9, 2008, after working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 with former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, Perrella Weinberg Partners' Peter Weinberg, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Stephen Friedman (January 2008 - May 7, 2009) and current CEO Lloyd Blankfien.
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Steel was very close to Paulson at Goldman Sachs;

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/11/AR2008021102915.html?sid=ST2008021102958
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Bloomberg News reported that "[Robert] Steel, 62, who had previously worked with Peter Weinberg at Goldman Sachs Group Inc., considered joining Perella Weinberg when the firm opened its doors in 2006... Instead he went to work for the government, where he was a Treasury under secretary before he became CEO of Wachovia in July 2008".

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-28/perella-weinberg-names-ex-treasury-official-robert-steel-ceo.html
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As Robert Steel served as CEO of Wachovia as Stephen Friedman served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, they both currently work together at the Aspen Institue;

Robert K. Steel

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/people/robert-steel

Stephen Friedman

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/aspen-strategy-group/about-aspen-strategy-group/group-members/stephen-friedman
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"Timothy Geithner helped design and run the central bank’s lending programs", and was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 2003 to 2009, after which he became Treasury Secretary.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Geithner

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html

During Steel's tenure at the U.S. Treasury, he revived the President's Working Group, the core group to respond to the global economic crisis of 2008.

http://www.pwpartners.com/our-team/partners/biography?id=2475

Steel "revived the President's Working Group" under Paulson, which included Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke and SEC Chair Christopher Cox.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Working_Group_on_Financial_Markets
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Before arriving at Wachovia, Steel was in a "need to know position" concerning massive undisclosed material borrowing by many financial firms administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, most of which occured under Stephen Friedman and Tim Geithner's tenure, that overwhelmingly most firms did not provide details of within required SEC filings, especially the size of credit lines available to Wachovia and Wells Fargo;

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html
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From 2006 through 2008, current SEC Chair Mary Jo White's husband John served as Director of the Division of Corporation Finance at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies in the United States.  Mr. White was head of the SEC division which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies.  "[Mr. White] played an integral role in the SEC’s response to market turmoil throughout 2008, ensuring that the Division acted swiftly to facilitate strategic transactions and access to capital for public companies."

http://www.cravath.com/jwhite/
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Stephen Friedman, while administering undisclosed loans to most of Wall Street as Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York purchased Goldman Sachs stock when it traded at historical lows in the fourth quarter of 2008 without being arrested and prosecuted for insider trading by Obama's Justice Department.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldman_Sachs
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On March 27, 2008, Wachovia borrowed a not disclosed $3.5 billion from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), unencumbered Assets, representing assets free and clear of any encumbrances such as creditor claims or liens, showed that Wachovia had available unreported Federal Reserve credit line worth $53.652 Billion, as discovered by Plaintiff in 2014 posted on the Federal Reserve's website as of August 2, 2013 as confirmed by Federal Reserve Public Affairs officer Cecelia Bradshaw on November 20, 2014.

On 6/30/2008, Wachovia's outstanding Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility borrowings totaled $10 billion, representing a material 29.82% of the company's market capitalization.

Wachovia Corporation's June 30, 2008 form 10-Q certified by Robert Steel did not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of financial assistance provided by the Fed.

http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=6092516

On July 22, 2008, Mr. Steel personally purchased 1,000,000 shares of Wachovia’s stock as the company’s undisclosed Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (TAF) borrowing reached $12.5 billion, representing a material 34.85% of the company's market capitalization.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/26728133#

On September 23, 2008, Goldman Sachs announced Warren Buffett, who owned 9.2% of Wells Fargo in 2007, purchased $5 billion of Goldman Sachs perpetual preferred stock warrants to purchase $5 billion of Goldman Sachs common stock.

"We view it as a strong validation of our client franchise and future prospects," said Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.”

On 9/25/2008, when Wachovia borrowed an undisclosed $5 billion from the Fed's Term Auction Facility, Unencumbered Assets, representing the Fed credit line available to Wachovia was $56.848 Billion.  The $12.5 billion outstanding borrowings by Wachovia on 9/25/2008 represented a material 42.26% of the companies market capitalization of $29.576 billion.

Wachovia's $56.848 Billion in Unencumbered Assets with the Fed represented almost twice the company's market capitalization.

Wachovia CEO Robert Steel falsely certified Wachovia's Quarterly Report as of September 30, 2008, as the $12.5 billion borrowed by Wachovia on 9/30/2008 represented a material 165.43% of the companies market capitalization;

"I, Robert K. Steel, certify that:  I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 of Wachovia Corporation;  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report."

http://www.taxpayer.net/user_uploads/file/Bailout/BankBios/WellsFargo/Finance/WACHOVIACORP%2010Q%203rd%20qtr%202008.pdf

The Federal Reserve unanimously approved Wachovia's merger with Wells Fargo on October 12, 2008, as Wachovia's Fed Discount Window borrowings were a material 449.72% of the company's market capitalization.

On October 31, 2008, the Federal Reserve was aware Wachovia and Wells Fargo CEO's Robert Steel and John Stumpf lied in a merger related SEC filing.

"Wachovia's financial advisors (Goldman Sachs and Perella Weinberg) informed Wachovia that the type of analysis customarily performed was not meaningful for Wachovia because of the extraordinary circumstances faced by Wachovia and its severe liquidity crisis..."

http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/Young%20Affidavit.pdf

Wachovia's stock price on date of first TAF loan: 3/27/2008 - Last Trade: 27.07

Wachovia price on date of completed merger with Wells: 12/31/2008 - Last Trade: 5.54

As of January 31, 2008, there were 1,981,983,990 Wachovia shares outstanding.

27.07 - 5.54 = 21.53 x 1,981,983,990 = $42,672,115,304.70 Wachovia market capitalization lost between the first undisclosed TAF loan and Wells Fargo merger.

Items 24 - 52;

https://casetext.com/briefs/E5uSKe_lC40RKJR2UOBB6LJc50s
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Following the merger, Steel was invited to join the board of Wells Fargo and served on the firm's credit and finance committees.  In 2010, upon being appointed Deputy Mayor for Economic Development of New York City, Steel resigned his seat on the Wells Fargo board.

On June 22, 2010, Steel was appointed by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to serve as Deputy Mayor for Economic Development.

On August 22, 2011, Bloomberg's Bradley Keoun and Phil Kuntz wrote "Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret Loans" which only mentions collateral and securities pledged for Morgan Stanley; "...Morgan Stanley borrowed $61.3 billion from one Fed program in September 2008, pledging a total of $66.5 billion of collateral". 

Bloomberg News failed/declined to report massive available credit lines for tens of other firms including Wachovia and Wells Fargo, after Robert Steel went to work for Michael Bloomberg.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-21/wall-street-aristocracy-got-1-2-trillion-in-fed-s-secret-loans.html

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO, after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth, with the help of his former collegues from Goldman Sachs at the New York Fed and the Treasury Department, along with current SEC chair Mary Jo White's husband without being prosecuted by the Obama Administration's Justice Department and without Bloomberg News or any other mainstream news outlet reporting the story.

George Hartzman