A User’s Guide to Hartzman’s Inquisitions

The following is a most recent culmination of thought that has provided a way to discover how to navigate my life, and I offer it as a vehicle for others to find answers to questions they may or may not have thought of. If what others think is true may not be what you do, interpretations should differ.

Thoughts of the past and future are dependent on existing in the present.

If we think, we are. We were who we think we were. We are what we think we are.

If nothing changes, we may or may not be who we think we’ll be.

If what was, is, or will be is uncertain, the only certainty appears to be present thought.

We may not actually know some of what we think we know.

What we don’t know we don’t know is more than we think.

What is may have been before the beginning, and may still be after the end.

Some of what we need, we don’t know or can’t choose to do, like hunger or thirst.

To exist in the present, we must have acquired enough need in the past to make it happen.

Need appears to be thought, sustenance, hygiene and a temperate climate.

Threatened need alters thought.

The less you think you need, the easier it is to take care of.

Want is everything else, but you have to acquire need to get it.

Over-prioritizing present want can sacrifice future need.

In want is not how much but how happy, Wealth = Happiness If want depends non purposefully not understanding need, what looks obtainable may not be.

Want can be eliminating unneeded.

In time, we “do” in the present, so doing nothing is choosing to do something.

Creating a higher likelihood of a better present by securing need and achieving want in the shortest time with the least risk, by thinking of what to don and when, relative to what was and what could happen after what may happen next.

If thought is both logical and emotional, what we do is too.

If what we think was derived from choice or influence, what we think is may not be.

If emotion occurs before thought, reaction can precede comprehension.

Some of what we think we know, we don’t.

Don’t think you need want, want what you can’t get, or think you know what you don’t.

What to do should be an optimal point between need and want.

There may be less risk and greater return in learning from other people’s mistakes before having to learn from your own.

If there’s less risk and higher return in a plan fitting circumstances, than circumstances fitting a plan; acknowledge, adjust and overcome.

If not thinking isn’t, it’s not about what could’ve been or what may someday, it’s about what we do now.

Have as much fun as soon as possible, with the least amount of risk for as long as you can.

http://yesweekly.com/article-18056-a-user%25E2%2580%2599s-guide-to-hartzman%25E2%2580%2599s-inquisitions.html

Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, Wachovia and Perella Weinberg Story

On February 17, 2016 as a pro se litigant, I survived a motion to dismiss in a federal court which implicates many Wall Street execs with false SEC certifications, securities fraud and insider trading during the financial crisis .

Wachovia's shareholders were misled, including perjury on a North Carolina business court.

I can provide documentation of the following;

In 2008 and 2009, Wachovia borrowed billions from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) with an undisclosed and underutilized  Federal Reserve credit line worth more than $50 Billion.

After working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 and serving with Hank Paulson at the US Treasury Department, former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleague Peter Weinberg and Goldman Sachs, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission split between Perella Weinberg Partners and Goldman Sachs, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive undisclosed Federal Reserve credit lines.

As Wells Fargo also borrowed from the same Term Auction Facility with a massive undisclosed credit line, both Steel and Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf illegally traded their company's stocks with inside information and falsely certified SEC and merger related court filings.

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel then earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth and misleading a North Carolina Business Court without consequence, costing Wachovia shareholders including North Carolina's pension plan more than $42 billion.

SEC Whistleblower Evidence

Winston Salem Journal's Richard Craver; "Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision"

from: Craver, Richard N.
to: "hartzman
date: Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM
subject: Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision
mailed-by: wsjournal.com
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from: George Hartzman
to: "Craver, Richard N."
date: Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 12:23 PM
subject: Re: Do you have comment or future plans related to WF legal decision
mailed-by: gmail.com

In 2008 and 2009, Wachovia borrowed billions from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) with an undisclosed and underutilized  Federal Reserve credit line worth more than $50 Billion.

After working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 and serving with Hank Paulson at the US Treasury Department, former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel and Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleauge Peter Weinberg and Goldman Sachs, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission split between Perella Weinberg Partners and Goldman Sachs, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive undisclosed Federal Reserve credit lines.

Both Steel and Stumpf signed false SEC certifications and oversaw misleading and inaccurate court filings in the process, as Wells Fargo also borrowed from the same Term Auction Facility with a massive undisclosed credit line.

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO, after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth and misleading a North Carolina Business Court without consequence, costing Wachovia shareholders more than $42 billion.

Now that I have survived Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss litigating by and for myself, I am now looking for legal representation.

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"MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; OSTEEN, JR., District Judge; GEORGE HARTZMAN, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, Defendant; 1:14CV808"

"...This matter is now ripe for resolution, and for the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 22, 2014, by filing a complaint alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for reporting Defendant’s allegedly fraudulent practices, in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).

...Plaintiff alleges that, while employed by Defendant, he raised “federal criminal concerns” through a confidential company ethics reporting channel.

...On November 29, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Accounting Irregularities,” which included “concerns raised about accounting, internal accounting controls, and auditing matters.” (Id.) On December 2, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Falsification of Company Records,” which apparently concerned the “accuracy and completeness of corporate financial reports.” (Id.) Finally, on December 3, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a complaint he summarizes as involving “Auditing Irregularities,” wherein he quoted Wells Fargo’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, which states that: "All business transactions . . . must be properly and accurately recorded . . . in accordance with applicable accounting standards, legal requirements, and Wells Fargo’s system of internal controls. Falsification of any company . . . information is prohibited. Falsification refers to knowingly misstating, . . . or omitting or deleting information from a Wells Fargo record or system which results in something that is untrue, fraudulent or misleading."

...While it is difficult to glean from the pleadings the exact nature of Plaintiff’s concerns, they apparently boil down to an allegation that Wells Fargo violated its Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) reporting requirements by omitting from its filings that it had received (or, at minimum, by omitting the size and source of) what Plaintiff refers to as “secret loans” from the Federal Reserve... 5 ...These loans are apparently funds that Wells Fargo received access to under the federal Term Auction Facility during the financial crisis.

...At some point after Plaintiff raised these concerns, Wells Fargo apparently hired an outside consulting firm, Oyster Consulting, LLC (“Oyster”), to investigate his claims. (See id. ¶¶ 14-21.) Plaintiff contends that this report, which concludes both that Plaintiff’s complaints were given a fair hearing by Wells Fargo and that his complaints were without merit both as to Wells Fargo’s financial
statements and as to the Envision Reports, is essentially a sham... 6 ...Plaintiff’s contentions regarding this report range from complaints that Oyster never interviewed anyone outside of Wells Fargo other than “shills” of the alleged con to allegations that the report was “withheld” from him in violation of SarbanesOxley and RICO.

...After the investigation began, Plaintiff continued to raise his concerns with Wells Fargo internally, both by repeatedly attempting to follow up with the individuals in charge of his original ethics line complaints and by sending emails to multiple executives at Wells Fargo on March 4, 2012, including Danny Ludeman, the CEO of Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, and John Stumpf, the CEO of Wells Fargo & Co. (Id. ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff was told to keep his communications regarding his concerns limited to the Ethics Line, (id. ¶ 41), and was told that he needed to cease his activities on several occasions, including by email on January 4, 2012, and January 19, 2012.

...Plaintiff also at some point apparently posted information about his concerns on his personal blog and began raising these issues during teaching events, because he was told in mid-June of 2012 both to cancel any future events and to take down his blog.

...Title VIII of SOX is designated as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. Section 806 of this Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, provides “whistleblower”  protection to employees of publicly traded companies. SOX prohibits retaliation against an employee who “provide[s] information, cause[s] information to be provided, or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes” mail, wire, or securities fraud, a violation of any rule or regulation of the SEC, or a violation of any federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1).

...Plaintiff essentially contends that he “blew the whistle” on two situations: (1) that Defendant failed to include certain funds received from the Federal Reserve (the “secret loans”) in their SEC filings from 2008 and 2009, and (2) that Defendant’s Envision Reports failed to include client costs in their projections, allegedly constituting mail, wire, and/or securities fraud.

...it does not appear that Plaintiff’s subjective belief about his allegations is in question. Although it is an extremely close issue as to the sufficiency of both the specificity and plausibility of Plaintiff’s allegations on this issue, the court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden of pleading an objectively reasonable belief regarding Wells Fargo’s alleged failure to include the receipt of federal monies in its SEC filings. The strength and veracity of those pleadings will be determined at a later stage.

...Plaintiff alleges that Defendant submitted Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 certifications that did not include “unencumbered collateral pledged on December 20, 2007, at the beginning of Defendant’s first [Federal Reserve] offered Term Auction Facility (TAF) loan” which Plaintiff alleges represents a massive undisclosed credit line that was not properly disclosed in Defendant’s SEC filings.

 Defendant also alleges that the SEC at some point inquired about these SEC filings, citing to a letter between Wells Fargo and the SEC. (Id. ¶ 21.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges both that the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State found enough merit to his concerns on this issue to refer them to FINRA and the SEC, and former SEC officials who were interviewed about the issue found plausible violations among his concerns. (Id. ¶ 86.) Taking his allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged that: (1) Defendant received large low-interest loans from the Government; (2) those loans were not disclosed as required in their SEC filings; and (3) other financial experts saw these facts as a problem. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 21, 86.) At this stage, Plaintiff has alleged enough to show the objective reasonableness of his concerns. If financial experts and the SEC itself were concerned about the materiality of these nondisclosures and possible violations of the securities laws, it is contrary to reason to find it unreasonable for Plaintiff to have believed they were violations as well. As such, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged that he had an objectively reasonable belief that these actions constituted a violation of the law.

...There appears to be no dispute as to the second and third elements that Plaintiff must allege, namely that: (1) Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s protected activity, and (2) Plaintiff suffered an adverse personnel decision when he was given a formal warning and ultimately terminated. As such, the only remaining relevant inquiry is whether or not Plaintiff’s reporting of these believed violations was a “contributing factor” in that adverse personnel decision. See Livingston, 520 F.3d at 351-52.

...There is nothing in the record showing the internal process used to terminate Plaintiff, or any document or affidavit detailing the rationale behind that decision.

...Plaintiff initially brought his claims to Wells Fargo in late November and early December of 2011. (See Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 36) ¶ 13). Plaintiff then continued to pursue these claims internally despite first being told that his complaints were being investigated and finally being given instructions to stop raising the issue. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 52.) The report from the internal investigation that Wells Fargo commissioned was finalized on July 23, 2012. (Id. ¶ 44.) That same day, Plaintiff was issued a “Final Warning.”

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 36) is DISMISSED as to all claims except for his claim for retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley, specifically as it relates to his raising of concerns regarding whether government loans were properly disclosed in Wells Fargo’s SEC filings from 2008 and 2009.

This the 17th day of February, 2016.

WILLIAM OSTEEN, JR."

Too Connected to Jail; The Short, Short Version

Former Wachovia CEO Robert Steel, with the help of former Goldman Sachs colleauge Peter Weinberg, misled Wachovia's board of directors to sell Wachovia to Wells Fargo for a $50 million commission of which Goldman Sachs recieved half of, without telling Wachovia shareholders of massive Federal Reserve credit lines, with the help of key Bush and Obama administration personel.

Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf knew and went along with the merger, signing false SEC certifications in the process.

The following was filed with the Middle District of North Carolina United States District Court on December 3, 2014 in an Amended Complaint;

https://casetext.com/briefs/E5uSKe_lC40RKJR2UOBB6LJc50s.
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Robert Steel served as Under Secretary for Domestic Finance of the United States Treasury under Hank Paulson until October 10, 2006, before becoming CEO of Wachovia on July 9, 2008, after working at Goldman Sachs from 1976 to 2004 with former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, Perrella Weinberg Partners' Peter Weinberg, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Stephen Friedman (January 2008 - May 7, 2009) and current CEO Lloyd Blankfien.
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Steel was very close to Paulson at Goldman Sachs;

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/11/AR2008021102915.html?sid=ST2008021102958
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Bloomberg News reported that "[Robert] Steel, 62, who had previously worked with Peter Weinberg at Goldman Sachs Group Inc., considered joining Perella Weinberg when the firm opened its doors in 2006... Instead he went to work for the government, where he was a Treasury under secretary before he became CEO of Wachovia in July 2008".

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-28/perella-weinberg-names-ex-treasury-official-robert-steel-ceo.html
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As Robert Steel served as CEO of Wachovia as Stephen Friedman served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, they both currently work together at the Aspen Institue;

Robert K. Steel

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/people/robert-steel

Stephen Friedman

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/aspen-strategy-group/about-aspen-strategy-group/group-members/stephen-friedman
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"Timothy Geithner helped design and run the central bank’s lending programs", and was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 2003 to 2009, after which he became Treasury Secretary.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Geithner

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html

During Steel's tenure at the U.S. Treasury, he revived the President's Working Group, the core group to respond to the global economic crisis of 2008.

http://www.pwpartners.com/our-team/partners/biography?id=2475

Steel "revived the President's Working Group" under Paulson, which included Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke and SEC Chair Christopher Cox.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Working_Group_on_Financial_Markets

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Before arriving at Wachovia, Steel was in a "need to know position" concerning massive undisclosed material borrowing by many financial firms administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, most of which occured under Stephen Friedman and Tim Geithner's tenure, that overwhelmingly most firms did not provide details of within required SEC filings, especially the size of credit lines available to Wachovia and Wells Fargo;

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html
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From 2006 through 2008, current SEC Chair Mary Jo White's husband John served as Director of the Division of Corporation Finance at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies in the United States.  Mr. White was head of the SEC division which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies.  "[Mr. White] played an integral role in the SEC’s response to market turmoil throughout 2008, ensuring that the Division acted swiftly to facilitate strategic transactions and access to capital for public companies."

http://www.cravath.com/jwhite/
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Stephen Friedman, while administering undisclosed loans to most of Wall Street as Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York purchased Goldman Sachs stock when it traded at historical lows in the fourth quarter of 2008 without being arrested and prosecuted for insider trading by Obama's Justice Department.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldman_Sachs
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On March 27, 2008, Wachovia borrowed a not disclosed $3.5 billion from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), unencumbered Assets, representing assets free and clear of any encumbrances such as creditor claims or liens, showed that Wachovia had available unreported Federal Reserve credit line worth $53.652 Billion, as discovered by Plaintiff in 2014 posted on the Federal Reserve's website as of August 2, 2013 as confirmed by Federal Reserve Public Affairs officer Cecelia Bradshaw on November 20, 2014.

On 6/30/2008, Wachovia's outstanding Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility borrowings totaled $10 billion, representing a material 29.82% of the company's market capitalization.

Wachovia Corporation's June 30, 2008 form 10-Q certified by Robert Steel did not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of financial assistance provided by the Fed.

http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=6092516

On July 22, 2008, Mr. Steel personally purchased 1,000,000 shares of Wachovia’s stock as the company’s undisclosed Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (TAF) borrowing reached $12.5 billion, representing a material 34.85% of the company's market capitalization.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/26728133#

On September 23, 2008, Goldman Sachs announced Warren Buffett, who owned 9.2% of Wells Fargo in 2007, purchased $5 billion of Goldman Sachs perpetual preferred stock warrants to purchase $5 billion of Goldman Sachs common stock.

"We view it as a strong validation of our client franchise and future prospects," said Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman and CEO of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.”

On 9/25/2008, when Wachovia borrowed an undisclosed $5 billion from the Fed's Term Auction Facility, Unencumbered Assets, representing the Fed credit line available to Wachovia was $56.848 Billion.  The $12.5 billion outstanding borrowings by Wachovia on 9/25/2008 represented a material 42.26% of the companies market capitalization of $29.576 billion.

Wachovia's $56.848 Billion in Unencumbered Assets with the Fed represented almost twice the company's market capitalization.

Wachovia CEO Robert Steel falsely certified Wachovia's Quarterly Report as of September 30, 2008, as the $12.5 billion borrowed by Wachovia on 9/30/2008 represented a material 165.43% of the companies market capitalization;

"I, Robert K. Steel, certify that:  I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 of Wachovia Corporation;  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report."

http://www.taxpayer.net/user_uploads/file/Bailout/BankBios/WellsFargo/Finance/WACHOVIACORP%2010Q%203rd%20qtr%202008.pdf

The Federal Reserve unanimously approved Wachovia's merger with Wells Fargo on October 12, 2008, as Wachovia's Fed Discount Window borrowings were a material 449.72% of the company's market capitalization.

On October 31, 2008, the Federal Reserve was aware Wachovia and Wells Fargo CEO's Robert Steel and John Stumpf lied in a merger related SEC filing.

"Wachovia's financial advisors (Goldman Sachs and Perella Weinberg) informed Wachovia that the type of analysis customarily performed was not meaningful for Wachovia because of the extraordinary circumstances faced by Wachovia and its severe liquidity crisis..."

http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/Young%20Affidavit.pdf

Wachovia's stock price on date of first TAF loan: 3/27/2008 - Last Trade: 27.07

Wachovia price on date of completed merger with Wells: 12/31/2008 - Last Trade: 5.54

As of January 31, 2008, there were 1,981,983,990 Wachovia shares outstanding.

27.07 - 5.54 = 21.53 x 1,981,983,990 = $42,672,115,304.70 Wachovia market capitalization lost between the first undisclosed TAF loan and Wells Fargo merger.

Items 24 - 52;

https://casetext.com/briefs/E5uSKe_lC40RKJR2UOBB6LJc50s
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Following the merger, Steel was invited to join the board of Wells Fargo and served on the firm's credit and finance committees.  In 2010, upon being appointed Deputy Mayor for Economic Development of New York City, Steel resigned his seat on the Wells Fargo board.

On June 22, 2010, Steel was appointed by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to serve as Deputy Mayor for Economic Development.

On August 22, 2011, Bloomberg's Bradley Keoun and Phil Kuntz wrote "Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret Loans" which only mentions collateral and securities pledged for Morgan Stanley; "...Morgan Stanley borrowed $61.3 billion from one Fed program in September 2008, pledging a total of $66.5 billion of collateral". 

Bloomberg News failed/declined to report massive available credit lines for tens of other firms including Wachovia and Wells Fargo, after Robert Steel went to work for Michael Bloomberg.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-21/wall-street-aristocracy-got-1-2-trillion-in-fed-s-secret-loans.html

After paying Peter Weinberg's Perella Weinberg Partners $25 million and Weinberg and Steels' former employer Goldman Sachs $25 million to advise Wachovia on the merger with Wells Fargo, Steel became CEO of Perella Weinberg Partners in 2014.

Robert Steel earned some of the money he allocated to Perella Weinberg Partners as Wachovia's CEO, after he sold Wachovia to Wells Fargo for substantially less than it was worth, with the help of his former collegues from Goldman Sachs at the New York Fed and the Treasury Department, along with current SEC chair Mary Jo White's husband without being prosecuted by the Obama Administration's Justice Department and without Bloomberg News or any other mainstream news outlet reporting the story.

George Hartzman

"Envision" Retirement Plan Incentive Bonus Fraud

Wells Fargo defrauded, recommitted and is currently committing fraud on thousands of Wells Fargo clients whose accounts are governed by The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 via misleading Envision financial plans updated without matching Envision financial plan asset allocation models to investment accounts, so Financial Advisors could qualify for the 4front incentive bonus' after the Wells Fargo Wachovia merger.

In 2009, while in possession of TARP monies, Wells Fargo initiated a pattern of the use of a device and scheme to defraud the U.S. government and clients with more than $250,000 held at Wells Fargo, by omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make statements made by hundreds if thousands of Envision plan reports delivered by wire and the mail, created by thousands of financial advisors, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading via the 4front Envision plan related financial advisor retention bonus program...in violation of federal laws.

Many of the households whose accounts were/are governed under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 were used to get the 4front bonus', which makes it illegal, as Financial Advisors were compensated over and above what was disclosed to clients via the use of misleading information.

Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, …to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;  to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; or...  to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."

If about 10,000  Financial Advisors had to do a minimum of 25 Envision Investment Plans on households worth at least $250,000 to receive Wells Fargo 4Front compensation retention bonus' after Wells acquisition of Wachovia, and the average assets held by households that received 4Front Envision plans was/is about $450,000, and the average number of qualifying for 4Front Envision Plans was/is about 35 per Financial Advisor, and if about 10,000 FA's created about 35 plans each = 350,000 4Front Envision Plans, and about 350,000 x what could be about $450,000 of assets held for each household = $157,500,000,000, meaning it looks like it happened to more than $150 billion of Wells Fargo Advisors client assets, much of which was covered by fiduciary obligations under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which made the scheme illegal.

As a fiduciary, Wells Fargo is currently defrauding and recommitting fraud on what appears to be hundreds of thousands of clients, many with accounts governed by The Investment Advisors Act of 1940, via misleading Envision financial plans created to qualify for the 4front incentive bonus and updated without including charged investment costs in projected minimum client goals.

I believe Wells Fargo violated the following laws;

29 U.S. Code § 1104 - Fiduciary duties

8 U.S. Code § 1343 - Fraud by wire, radio, or television

17 CFR 240.10b-5 - Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices

15 U.S. Code § 77q - Fraudulent interstate transactions

15 U.S. Code § 80a–35 - Breach of fiduciary duty

15 U.S. Code § 80a–47 - Liability of controlling persons; preventing compliance

15 U.S. Code § 80b–6 - Prohibited transactions by investment advisers

17 CFR 240.10b-3 - Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices by brokers or dealers

15 U.S. Code § 78t - Liability of controlling persons and persons who aid and abet violations
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I believe most Wells Fargo Advisors Envision financial/investment plans created to earn ‘retention’ bonuses appear to have defrauded the government after Wachovia and Wells Fargo merged while in possession of taxpayer funded TARP and other bailouts.  I believe Wells Fargo executive management defrauded the government by creating a illegal path to retain advisors after receiving government bailouts, by mandating a fraudulent path for advisors to acquire retention bonuses.  I believe Wells Fargo’s executive management created a backdoor retention program that led thousands of brokers to violate fiduciary duties to the firm’s clients, by incentivizing the omission of investment fees in Envision plans subsequently reported on client statements.

I have worked as a financial advisor since 1993, and have taught CPA and attorney financial ethics in North Carolina for more than a decade.

On February 20, 2009, taxpayer bailed out Citigroup’s Morgan Stanley Smith Barney announced about a $2 to $3 billion retention plan to retain their securities brokers.  The same day, Wachovia Securities announced the firm's brokers would not receive a retention bonus, but financial advisors could receive payouts from its 4front program, which involved creating "Envision" investment/financial plans for current clients.

Janet Levaux of Advisor One reported “For 4front, advisors must complete financial plans using the company's Envision software for at least 25 households with $250,000 in assets under management...This makes our company a compelling place for advisors to stay and run their business," said Wachovia Securities spokesperson Anthony Mattera.  Halah Touryalai of Wealth Management.com reported “...the firm takes a “snapshot” to look at how many households and assets advisors have in Envision Plans. The more households and assets with “Envision Plans,” the larger the bonus a rep can receive.”

I chose not to apply/qualify for 4front until U.S. taxpayers were paid back money loaned through TARP.  When the first round of Envision plans were created, word came down from executive management imploring our office to not create too many Envision plans at the same time to keep up appearances.

Matt Taibbi "Secret and Lies of the Bailout"

Many Wells Fargo Envision Plans created to earn 4front bonuses did not include investment fees.  On September 7, 2012, in front of 25 to 40 financial advisors at the Hyatt Regency St. Louis at The Arch, Greg Shiveley, Envision Sales Manager at Wells Fargo Advisors, said “There are 441,942 households with Envision Plans of Record.” and “The overwhelming majority of Envision Plans do not include investment costs."  One reason so many Wells Fargo households have Envision Plans of Record (POR), was to avoid negative press coverage by obscuring retention bonuses after the company received overt and covert taxpayer bailouts.  If the average household with an Envision Plan had $400,000, about $177 billion of client assets may be involved.  If “the overwhelming majority of Envision Plans [did and] do not include investment costs,” and Plans of Record appear on client statements, hundreds of thousands of Wells Fargo clients are currently being illegally misinformed as to the probabilities of achieving their financial goals.

I violated my fiduciary responsibilities to clients with advisory accounts by not including investment fees in their Envision plans, along with thousands of other Wells Fargo Financial Advisors.  Wachovia Securities executives who visited the Greensboro’s 3623 North Elm Street Branch told a meeting of brokers that the retention program tied to Envision investment plans was set up to avoid critical press reports about TARP being money used to “retain” financial advisers.  We were told “do the plans and get paid.”

Envision plans can be manipulated to sell clients and prospects on new investment ideas, staying on a current course with a financial adviser, and with the "retention" plan, game compensation in violation of Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

Matt Taibbi on George Hartzman's Whistleblower Filing

These outcomes are repeatable, meaning this can be duplicated on any Wells Fargo Advisors computer by others investigating independently.

The following “Internal Use Only” document states: "If left at 0%, the Return Discount Rate will not be displayed on any Envision report pages.  If you choose a Return Discount Rate above 0%, this assumption will be displayed on the Investment Plan Assumptions report page."  Meaning if the "Return Discount Rate", otherwise known as annual investment fees aren't included, the information does not show up in the client presentation, even though inflation, tax and turnover measures do.

As shown after the third main bullet point below, "Return Discount Rate" was called “Annual Investment Fee” before 2012.



Example: Harold Lynn

The following shows a comparison of two reproducible versions of the same Wells Fargo Envision Plan with one difference - investment fees.

"Harold Lynn" has $1,000,000 invested, with an annual investment fee of 2.5%.

Both versions have the same data inputs, except the second plan doesn't include the investment fees, like "the overwhelming majority of Envision Plans.”  The first plan includes 2.5% annual investment fees, which Harold is currently paying.

Again, Investment fees are not shown on client presentations unless entered, as seen on the following pages, even though both presentations include everything else.  Notice "Return Discount Rate" under "Investment Assumptions"

Note the absence of the “Return Discount Rate” under the description of “Investment Assumptions” in the second version of the plan.

Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, …to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client;  to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; or...  to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."

Without the investment fees included for Harold’s $1,000,000, Envision's software can generate the following client compliance approved graph indicating a high degree of wonderfulness if Harold continues to follow the recommendations.

The problem is the Envision Plan including what Harold is actually paying for his investments, is that he would need to begin with about $840,000 more to achieve similar results, meaning the plan not including the 2.5% annual investment fees clearly appears to be misleading.

The black dot on the Y axis of the charts indicates Harold's $1,000,000.

The two rising lines represent the “Target Zone”, which the software identifies as a “reasonable level of confidence that goals can be met or exceeded.”

The lowest lines in the graphs represent a 75% chance of reaching Harold’s goal.

The lines are much higher on the bottom graph when investment fees are included.

Wells Fargo Advisor's Internal Use Only "Presenting Envision results that matter" states "If the client has any doubts about the underlying assumptions, Advisors should be prepared to provide clarity and rationale. Observe that this is based on “IF” the client has doubts about assumptions, which means advisors do not need to burden clients with a detailed explanation of the assumptions if they are not in doubt of your ability to understand their goals and priorities." and "If the client asks you how their confidence is measured, this will require a careful explanation but it should not be focused on mathematics. Instead, the focus should be on the results of the math."  And "If you fall into the red, above target zone, you are making needless sacrifices to your lifestyle...," meaning some clients may be spending more than they "should", if investment fees are not included in Envision plan target zone calculations.

The "Internal Use Only" document (0211-5064) also states "Although it may be unintended and clearly disclosed away, this report will serve as a guarantee (in the eyes of the client) of how reality should unfold. It illustrates what they should have in taxable assets in 2013, their tax bill in 2015 and their net portfolio withdrawal in 2020. No matter how many disclosures that are made, how else would you perceive this report if you were a client?" and "With the Envision process, the job is to focus on what matters: the client’s confidence and comfort in achieving the goals they value most. Presenting results that matter is what creates the confidence and comfort the client desires."

4front

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say  “For credit in the 4front program, the Financial Advisor must designate an Envision profile in the Household as the [Envision Plan of Record] (POR).  This will identify the profile that was presented by the Financial Advisor and accepted by the client.  This requires that the plan reflects the client’s goals and risk tolerance, that it remains within the Target Zone...or has been within or above the Target Zone within the past 12 months...”

For many Wells Fargo Advisers, there was no way to both get the bonus and include investment costs.  I qualified with 27 households.  The minimum was 25.

To qualify for the 4front "retention" bonus, the black dot had to be above the bottom blue line, meaning the plan without investment fees would have qualified, while the other plan including fees wouldn't, meaning in overwhelmingly most cases, there was no way to both get the bonus and include investment fees.

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say “The Envision Plan of Record (POR) review is a standard part of the Envision process and of 4front...  Prior to granting a 4front Level One award, PORs will be reviewed to ensure that they have been presented to the client, reflect the client’s current goals and priorities, and have been or are in the process of being implemented.”

FINRA Rule 2210 states "All member communications must be based on principles of fair dealing and good faith, must be fair and balanced, and must provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular...service.  No member may omit any material fact or qualification if the omission, in light of the context of the material presented, would cause the communications to be misleading.  No member may make any false, exaggerated, unwarranted, promissory or misleading statement or claim in any communication.  No member may publish, circulate or distribute any communication that the member knows or has reason to know contains any untrue statement of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading.”

If “The overwhelming majority of Envision Plans do not include investment costs," I believe many of the 98% of Wells Fargo Envision Plan clients cited in this advertisement really don’t know where they stand in reaching their financial goals.

FINRA Rule 2210 also states “Information may be placed in a legend or footnote only in the event that such placement would not inhibit an investor's understanding of the communication.  Members must ensure that statements are clear and not misleading within the context in which they are made, and that they provide balanced treatment of risks and potential benefits.  ...Members must consider the nature of the audience to which the communication will be directed and must provide details and explanations appropriate to the audience.  Communications may not predict or project performance, ...or make any exaggerated or unwarranted claim, opinion or forecast...  Any comparison in retail communications between investments or services must disclose all material differences between them, including (as applicable) investment objectives, costs and expenses..."

Recommitting Fraud

Wells Fargo Advisors mandated Envision Plans of Record be updated annually, forcing thousands of Advisers who didn't include investment fees to repetitively recommit fraud upon their clients in later years.  Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents say “To receive credit for the review/update of an existing plan, you must …conduct a thorough review of client goals and account information, ensure that everything is up to date and that your advice is current.   If you discover that changes are needed, simply update the information, review accuracy and ensure that your advice is current and the plan is within or above the Target Zone.  A new Client Presentation or Progress Report must be generated with the past 12 months...[and] the plan is presented to the client and reviewed on at least an annual basis”, the results of which show up on client statements.

One of my assistants agreed to create the Envision Plans for the bonus.  The next year she agreed to update them.  In September 2012, I couldn't ask her to do it again after internally and externally whistleblowing and receiving the following email;

"From: PCG Administration;  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:45 PM To: Hartzman, George;  Subject: 4front Level One Long Term Standard of Care - August 2012 Status - Hartzman, George H - A254477;  Importance: High 

…As previously communicated, FAs who received a 4front Level One award are responsible for maintaining the same level of retail planning and institutional service as awarded through the Level One award program.  …As part of the 4front Level One Award, FAs are responsible for maintaining the Long-term Standard of Care (LTSC) requirements.  …requiring FAs to maintain the same level of client POR planning…  

…Each year for the duration of the 4front Level One program, the firm will review FAs’ Long-term Standard of Care based on a snapshot of client households. (The 2012 annual snapshot will take place on Oct. 31 [2012])  There is no grace period; therefore, FAs should ensure they are tracking their level of planning throughout the year…”

Internal Wells Fargo Advisors web pages and documents also say “...The Financial Adviser must keep their plans updated and continue serving their clients.  On an ongoing basis, the plans will be reviewed ...and the plan must be continually adjusted so that it will keep the client on track towards achieving their goals. (This is measured by looking at whether the plan is within or above the Target Zone...)”  Wells Fargo could also “cancel existing awards” and terminate for “failure to adhere to the guidelines”

Section 36 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 states "The Commission is authorized to bring an action...alleging that a person ...is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts, or at the time of the alleged misconduct, so served or acted — as ...investment adviser...”

“...the investment adviser … shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company… to such investment adviser…  An action may be brought … by the Commission...against such investment adviser... who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment company...to such investment adviser or person.  …It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty."

I have chosen to speak out for my clients, family, students, country and colleagues, instead of living out a fraud.

George Hartzman
President and Chief Economist: Think Professional Education
Former Vice President/Investments
Fundamental Choice Portfolio Manager, Wells Fargo Advisors

Addendum

This journey began by providing an external email address and phone number to Wells Fargo's confidential ethics hot line, after which I was contacted on multiple occasions by investigators on my company email and phone.  Realizing my anonymity was compromised and my family’s safety at risk, I took the issues to my local manager, after which Wells Fargo's executive management enlisted an outside ‘independent’ investigator who promptly found no merit to my assertions.  Thinking I could mitigate personal risk by contacting regulatory authorities, I filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) DC Office of the Whistleblower which went nowhere.  I then filed with the NC Secretary of State Securities Division, who investigated and referred files to Atlanta's SEC and FINRA offices.  The financial plan/bonus matter went back to FINRA’s DC Office of the Whistleblower from Atlanta and on to Kansas City's FINRA regional office, where Wells Fargo Advisors home office is located.  And then nothing.  American regulatory authorities will not say whether a case exists or if a case is opened or closed, even though I contacted the government during and after interactions with Wells Fargo management, leaving myself and loved ones at risk of reprisal.

My employment at Wells Fargo Advisors was terminated on Monday, October 8, 2012 in direct retaliation for disseminating whistleblower information that our regulatory infrastructure seems unwilling to act upon and our mass media won’t report.  My “U5” states “Termination Explanation: Violation of the firm’s policies, including policies prohibiting the disclosure of the firm’s proprietary and/or internal use only information”.

Bank of America Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

On November 6, 2008, Bank of America borrowed $15 billion at 0.60% from the Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility with $43.235 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, of which the amount borrowed, credit line, term and interest rate was not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public and presumably the SEC.

On November 20, 2008, Bank of America borrowed $15 billion at 0.51% from the Federal Reserve with $82.946 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, of which the amount borrowed, credit line, term and interest rate was not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC.

On January 2, 2009, Bank of America borrowed $15 billion at 0.20% from the Federal Reserve with $87.012 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, of which the amount borrowed, credit line, term and interest rate was not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC.

On January 15, 2009, Bank of America borrowed $15 billion at 0.25% from the Federal Reserve with $169.903 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, of which the amount borrowed, credit line, term and interest rate was not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC.

On January 29, 2009, Bank of America borrowed $15 billion at 0.25% from the Federal Reserve with $185.410 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, of which the amount borrowed, credit line, term and interest rate was not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC.

http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2008_AR.pdf

http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/71/71595/reports/2009_AR.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm
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While BAC was in possession of massive Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans with undisclosed credit lines, amounts borrowed, terms and interest rates not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC, Chairman CEO and Lewis Kenneth D. purchased BAC stock on 2008-11-04 for $1,987,030, 2009-01-20 for $1,203,000 and 2009-02-04 for $959,000 without being arrested for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, for violations of Sarbanes-Oxley reporting laws.

While BAC was in possession of massive Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans with undisclosed credit lines, amounts borrowed, terms and interest rates not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC, then President of Global Banking and Wealth Management Moynihan Brian T. purchased BAC stock on 2009-01-21 for $115,800, 2009-01-22 for $61,250, 2009-02-05 for $77,800 and 2009-02-06 for $61,400 without being arrested for Insider Trading.

While BAC was in possession of massive Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans with undisclosed credit lines, amounts borrowed, terms and interest rates not disclosed to Bank of America's shareholders, the public or presumably the SEC, then Pres Glbl Bkg Sec & Wlth Mgmt Thain John A. purchased BAC stock on 2009-01-21 for $483,319, without being arrested for Insider Trading.
                  
http://www.insider-monitor.com/trading/cik70858-3.html
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Previously;

$WFC CEO Stumpf and Chair Kovacevich Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-and.html


Wachovia CEO Robert Steel's Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/05/new-perella-weinberg-ceo-robert-steels.html

JPM CEO Jamie Dimon Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/happy-labor-day-jpm-ceo-jamie-dimon.html

Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/citibank-ceo-vikram-pandit-securities.html   

For the 400,000 plus Wells Fargo clients being lied to on their "Envision" retirement plans 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/01/envision.html

BB&T CEO Kelly King and CFO Daryl Bible Securities Fraud 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bb-ceo-kelly-king-and-cfo-daryl-bible.html

Securities Fraud and Perjury via the Wells Fargo Wachovia Merger

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/securities-fraud-and-perjury-via-wells.html

SEC Whistleblower Evidence 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/02/sec-and-finra-whistleblower-evidence.html

Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

On January 17, 2008, unknown to shareholders but known to Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich, Wells Fargo borrowed $1.666 billion from the Federal Reserve Bank's Term Auction Faciltiy at 3.95% interest, with $47.930 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, none of which was disclosed by Wells Fargo's 2008 annual report.

On May 22 2008, unknown to shareholders but known to Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich, Wells Fargo borrowed $7.5 billion from the Federal Reserve Bank's Term Auction Faciltiy at 2.1% interest, with $47.197 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, none of which was disclosed by Wells Fargo's 2008 annual report..
           
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm
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WFC's annual report cites the words "Term Auction" 0 times, and "TAF" 0 times, with no mention of the overall size of WFC's Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility credit lines, interest rates and maturities, all of which were material inside information known to Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich but not WFC shareholders, Congress, or the public.

https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/downloads/pdf/invest_relations/wf2008annualreport.pdf
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On 2008-05-15, while WFC was in possession of undisclosed Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans, Stumpf John G. purchased 1,550 of Wells Fargo stock valued at $44,841  without being arrested for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud.

On 2008-06-06, while WFC was in possession of undisclosed Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans, Kovacevich Richard M. purchased 40,398 of Wells Fargo stock valued at $1,052,367 without being arrested for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud.

http://www.insider-monitor.com/trading/cik72971-3.html   
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Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) states;

    "SEC.302. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL REPORTS.

    (a) REGULATIONS REQUIRED ...the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such section of such Act that--

    (2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading..."
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An SEC interpretation states: "Many financial institutions, such as thrifts and banks, are receiving financial assistance in connection with federally assisted acquisitions or restructurings...  If these or any other types of federal financial assistance have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to have a material future effect upon, financial condition or results of operations, the [Management Discussion and Analysis] should provide disclosure of the nature, amounts, and effects of such assistance..."

http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm
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I believe CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich are guilty of Securities Fraud and Insider Trading, with the consent of the Federal Reserve, the SEC etc... and the Justice Department.
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From 2006 through 2008, SEC Chair Mary Jo White's husband John served as Director of the Division of Corporation Finance at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies in the United States.was head of the SEC division which oversees disclosure and reporting by public companies. Mr. White played an integral role in the SEC’s response to market turmoil throughout 2008, ensuring that the Division acted swiftly and appropriately to facilitate strategic transactions and access to capital for public companies.
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Bloomberg's Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun, Phil Kuntz, Alison Fitzgerald, Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, Noah Bhahayar, Dakin Campbell, Christopher Condon, Gavin Finch, Andrew Frye, Donal Griffin, Christine Harper, Takashiko Hyuga, Aaron Kirchfeld, Dawn Kopecki, Rachel Layne, Elena Logutenkova, John Martens, Michael J. Moore, Howard Mustoe, Hugh Son, James Sterngold, Robert Friedman, John Voskuhl and Otis Bilodeau didn't bother to follow up on the story revealing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, to the benefit of Bloomberg companies.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html
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Previously;

BB&T CEO Kelly King and CFO Daryl Bible Securities Fraud

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bb-ceo-kelly-king-and-cfo-daryl-bible.html

JPM CEO Jamie Dimon Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/happy-labor-day-jpm-ceo-jamie-dimon.html

Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/citibank-ceo-vikram-pandit-securities.html

For the 400,000 plus Wells Fargo clients being lied to on their "Envision" retirement plans 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/01/envision.html

Bank of America Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bank-of-america-insider-trading-and.html

Securities Fraud and Perjury via the Wells Fargo Wachovia Merger

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/securities-fraud-and-perjury-via-wells.html

Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

On 2008-11-13, while Citibank was in possession of undisclosed Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility loans, Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit purchased 850,000 shares of Citibank stock valued at $9,633,050 without being arrested for Insider Trading and Securities Fraud.

During late 2007 and throughout 2008, unknown to shareholders but known to Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit, who certified Citibank's 2008 annual report filed with the SEC, Citibank borrowed billions from the Federal Reserve Bank's Term Auction Faciltiy on nine occations at interest rates as low as 0.42%, with up to $21.371 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, none of which was disclosed in Citibank's 2008 annual report.
           
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm
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Citibank's 2008 annual report cites the words "Term Auction" 0 times, and "TAF" 0 times, with no mention of the overall size of Citibank's Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility credit lines, interest rates and maturities, all of which were material inside information known to CEO Vikram Pandit but not Citibank shareholders, Congress, or the public.

http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar08c_en.pdf
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Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), which is certified in annual reports to the SEC states;

    "SEC.302. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL REPORTS.

    (a) REGULATIONS REQUIRED ...the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such section of such Act that--

    (2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading..."
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An SEC interpretation states: "Many financial institutions, such as thrifts and banks, are receiving financial assistance in connection with federally assisted acquisitions or restructurings...  If these or any other types of federal financial assistance have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to have a material future effect upon, financial condition or results of operations, the [Management Discussion and Analysis] should provide disclosure of the nature, amounts, and effects of such assistance..."

http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm
.
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I believe Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit is guilty of Securities Fraud and Insider Trading, with the consent of the Federal Reserve, the SEC etc... and the Justice Department.
.
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Previously;

BB&T CEO Kelly King and CFO Daryl Bible Securities Fraud

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bb-ceo-kelly-king-and-cfo-daryl-bible.html

Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf and Chairman Richard Kovacevich Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-and.html

JPM CEO Jamie Dimon Securities Fraud and Insider Trading

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/happy-labor-day-jpm-ceo-jamie-dimon.html

Zions Bank search for "Term Auction Facility" from thier fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 10k
http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/12/zion-bank-search-for-term-auction.html

For the 400,000 plus Wells Fargo clients being lied to on their "Envision" retirement plans 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/01/envision.html 

Bank of America Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bank-of-america-insider-trading-and.html

Securities Fraud and Perjury via the Wells Fargo Wachovia Merger

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/securities-fraud-and-perjury-via-wells.html

Wachovia CEO Robert Steel False Certifications and Zion Bank's fine filing, with some Matt Taiibi

As confirmed by Federal Reserve Public Affairs officer Cecelia Bradshaw on November 20, 2014, the Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) posted details of Wachovia and Wells Fargo's Term Auction Facility (TAF) loan Unencumbered Assets, representing Fed credit lines available to the two banks in 2008 and 2009 on August 2, 2013.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

According to the Fed as of August 2, 2013, on 3/27/2008, Wachovia borrowed $3.5 billion from the Fed's Term Auction Facility, representing a material 6.52% of the company's market capitalization, according to Bloomberg News.  According to the Fed, Unencumbered Assets representing Wachovia's credit line was $53.652 Billion on 3/27/2008.

According to the Bloomberg News, on 6/30/2008, Wachovia's outstanding Federal Reserve provided Term Auction Facility borrowings totaled $10 billion, representing a material 29.82% of the company's market capitalization.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html

A search by Plaintiff of Wachovia Corporation's form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2008, listing North Carolina as the "State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization", certified pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by ROBERT K. STEEL on August 11, 2008, does not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of financial assistance provided by the Fed and other material terms, and has not been restated since.

http://www.otcmarkets.com/edgar/GetFilingHtml?FilingID=6092516

On July 22, 2008, Mr. Steel personally purchased 1,000,000 shares of Wachovia’s stock as the company’s undisclosed Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (TAF) borrowing reached $12.5 billion, representing a material 34.85% of the company's market capitalization.

In an interview with CNBC's Jim Cramer On Monday, September 15, 2008, Steel said "I think it's really about...transparency. People have to understand the assets and really be able to say, this is what I own... Complete disclosure. ...we can work through this with transparency, liquidity and capital. ...Our strategy was to give you all the data so you could make your own model.  We tell you what we're doing... ...we're raising capital ourselves by basically shrinking the balance sheet, cutting the dividend, cutting expenses. We can create more capital ourselves that way... for now, we feel like we can work through this..." After Jim Cramer asked "Should there be any sort of quick regulatory relief from the SEC that would make life easier to be able to make your bank much stronger?", Mr. Steel responded "I don't think it's about my bank."

On 9/25/2008, when Wachovia borrowed an undisclosed $5 billion from the Fed's Term Auction Facilty, Unencumbered Assets, representing the Fed credit line available to Wachovia was $56.848 Billion, according to the Fed. The $12.5 billion outstanding borrowings by Wachovia on 9/25/2008 represented a material 42.26% of the companies market capitalization, according to Bloomberg News.

A search by Plaintiff of Wachovia Corporation's form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008, listing North Carolina as the "State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization", certified pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by ROBERT K. STEEL does not disclose the type, terms, interest charges, dates, collateral, values or amounts of financial assistance provided by the Fed and other material terms, and has not been restated since.

http://www.taxpayer.net/user_uploads/file/Bailout/BankBios/WellsFargo/Finance/WACHOVIACORP%2010Q%203rd%20qtr%202008.pdf

After not reporting TAF loans, Wachovia's CEO wrote "I, Robert K. Steel, certify that:  I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 of Wachovia Corporation;  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report" on October 30, 2008."

On October 30, 2008, Wachovia CEO Robert Steel falsely certified Wachovia's Quarterly Report as of September 30, 2008, as the $12.5 billion borrowed by Wachovia on 9/30/2008 represented a material 165.43% of the companies market capitalization, according to Bloomberg News.
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Wachovia's stock price on date of first TAF loan: 3/27/2008 - Last Trade: 27.07

Wachovia price on date of completed merger with Wells: 12/31/2008 - Last Trade: 5.54

As of January 31, 2008, there were 1,981,983,990 Wachovia shares outstanding.

27.07 - 5.54 = 21.53 x 1,981,983,990 = $42,672,115,304.70 Wachovia market capitalization lost between the first undisclosed TAF loan and Wells Fargo merger.
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On January 1st, 2008, Plaintiff had 60.9586 Shares/Units of Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP the company's ERISA governed 401(k) savings plan with a Beginning Balance of $922.01, losing $267.04 by March 31, 2008.

From January 1st, 2008 to March 31, 2008 Plaintiff contributed $207.21 to Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP leaving an Ending Balance of $862.18 and 79.3237 Shares/Units

Plaintiff's Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP Ending Balance on June 30, 2008 was $618.68 with 96.7049 Shares/Units after contributing $146.67, losing $390.17.

Plaintiff's Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP Ending Balance on September 30, 2008 was $243.68 with 128.7342 Shares/Units after contributing $152.25, losing $390.17.

Plaintiff's Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP Ending Balance on December 31, 2008 was $755.39 with 248.9493 Shares/Units after contributing $354.74, earning $156.97.

From January 1st, 2008 to December 31, 2008, Plaintiff began with $922.01 of Wachovia Stock Non-ESOP, contributing $860.87 for a total of $1,782.88 in principal, for a loss of $1,027.49 in 2008.
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Zions Bancorporation's fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 form 10-k states; "In December 2007, the Federal Reserve Board announced a new program, the Term Auction Facility (“TAF”), to make 28 day loans to banks in the United States and to foreign banks through foreign central banks. These loans are made using an auction process. Zions Bank is currently participating in the TAF and may continue to do so as long as money can be borrowed at an attractive rate.  The amount that can be borrowed is based upon the amount of collateral that has been pledged to the Federal Reserve Bank.  At December 31, 2008, $1.8 billion in borrowings were outstanding under this program as compared to $450 million at December 31, 2007.  However, by February 13, 2009, the TAF borrowings outstanding had been reduced to $500 million.  At December 31, 2008, the amount available for additional Federal Reserve borrowings was approximately $4.3 billion, which had increased to $5.7 billion by February 13, 2009. An additional $1.3 billion could be borrowed at December 31, 2008 upon the pledging of additional available collateral.

At December 31, 2008, the Company’s subsidiary banks had a total of $13.1 billion of immediately available, unused borrowing capacity at the Fed and various FHLBs, which had increased to $14.3 billion as of February 13, 2009."

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/109380/000119312509040927/d10k.htm
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On discovering whether or not the failures to disclose were actionable violations;

FYI From: Matthew Taibbi To: george hartzman Fri, November 30, 2012 10:29:49 AM

George just FYI -- I've talked to several prominent securities lawyers and some former congressional aides and you will be interested to know that nobody knows the answer to whether or not the failure to disclose secret Fed lending constitutes an actionable violation.

The issue, it seems, has not come up before.

One former Senate aide put it this way: "It certainly sounds like an omission of a material fact, but I doubt there's any precedent which establishes that it's a violation, especially when the Fed itself has a policy of keeping it secret (access to the Fed window undermines confidence in the bank)."
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Re: FYI From: Matt Taibbi To: george Hartzman

Ok we're getting warmer.  I just talked to one of the top securities lawyers in DC.  When asked if this is a material violation, he said "How could it not be?"  I want to show him an example of a bank that disclosed.  What was that NC bank again you mentioned?  Could you send me the 10K (if you haven't already)?
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Re: Another Broker From: Matt Taibbi To: george Hartzman

George, So I've been doing a lot of work on your stuff.  I had a conference call with Chase and a Treasury official on the disclosure issue. I also spoke with the former chief accountant of the SEC.  …In short the people who are more believable are in agreement with you. The banks' argument is that the info is not material.  But my SEC guy does not agree.
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George, here's what my ex-SEC friends sent me:

http://gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/DisclosureConsiderationsInTurbulentTimes.aspx

http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm

...check the 1989 guideline out. The passage that's most relevant reads:

"If these or any other types of federal financial assistance have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to have a material future effect upon, financial condition or results of operations, the MD&A should provide disclosure of the nature, amounts, and effects of such assistance."
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From: Matthew Taibbi To: george hartzman

…You know that stock purchase of Dimon's you sent to me?  Do you have any other examples of him buying stock?  That particular purchase was a bit unique and hard to unravel legally.  They were preferred shares not sold to him by the company.  Our lawyers are a little weirded out by it.  How do I look up his other purchases?  I know I should know this -- it's embarrassing, but trust me, it will help. Anyway, thanks again, and I'll talk to you soon,

Matt
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Wells Fargo refused to provide information concerning Envision plans created by William Spivey and Envision plans supervised by William Spivey and Aaron Landry

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/11/wells-fargo-refused-to-provide_25.html

Wells Fargo refused to provide information concerning Brian Mixdorf's internal investigation into George Hartzman's Ethics Line filings

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/11/wells-fargo-refused-to-provide.html

ROBERT K. STEEL and the President's Working Group

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/11/robert-k-steel-and-presidents-working.html

Wachovia CEO Robert Steel False Certifications and Zion Bank's fine filing, with some Matt Taiibi


http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/11/18-us-code-1343-fraud-by-wire-radio-or.html

Securities Fraud and Perjury via the Wells Fargo Wachovia Merger

Wachovia was was the fourth-largest bank holding company in the United States before its acquisition by Wells Fargo on December 31, 2008.

In negotiations and litigation before, during and after the closing of the merger deal, both Wachovia and Wells Fargo failed to disclose massive credit lines with the Federal Reserve via the Term Auction Facility, which could have affected the merger's negotiated terms.

On December 22, 2008, Wachovia borrowed $10 billion at 0.528% from the Federal Reserve for 17 days with $76.280 billion in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, none of which was disclosed to Wachovia's shareholders or the public before and after the merger with Wells Fargo. (Loan maturity - January 8, 2009, after the merger)

On February 26, 2008, Wells Fargo borrowed $10 billion at 0.42% from the Federal Reserve for 84 days with $56.796 billion  in Unencumbered Collateral representing an undisclosed credit line with the Fed, none of which was disclosed to Wells Fargo's shareholders or the public before and after the merger with Wachovia. (Loan maturity - February 26, 2009, after the merger)

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_taf.htm

Some Wachovia shareholders initiated litigation within which Wachovia and Wells Fargo didn't disclose the Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility credit lines.

I believe the North Carolina Business Court, where shareholder initiated merger related proceedings  took place, was misled by Wells Fargo and Wachovia.
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Previously;

$WFC CEO Stumpf and Chair Kovacevich Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-and.html


Wachovia CEO Robert Steel's Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/05/new-perella-weinberg-ceo-robert-steels.html

JPM CEO Jamie Dimon Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/happy-labor-day-jpm-ceo-jamie-dimon.html

Citibank CEO Vikram Pandit Securities Fraud and Insider Trading 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/citibank-ceo-vikram-pandit-securities.html   

For the 400,000 plus Wells Fargo clients being lied to on their "Envision" retirement plans 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2013/01/envision.html

BB&T CEO Kelly King and CFO Daryl Bible Securities Fraud 

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bb-ceo-kelly-king-and-cfo-daryl-bible.html

Bank of America Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

http://hartzman.blogspot.com/2014/09/bank-of-america-insider-trading-and.html